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ABSTRACT

This study uses sociological frameworks to examine the effects that judges’
personal characteristics, such as race, sex, political affiliation, and political ideology, as
well as personal characteristics of the plaintiff, such as race and sex, have on cases filed
in federal appellate courts dealing with sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Previous research examining these factors have produced conflicting
results. This study, using data extracted from Title VII cases dealing with sex from
federal appellate courts from 1995 to 2002, attempts to tease out these different effects.
Results indicate that the political ideology of the circuit in which the case is heard, the
political ideology of the appointing president, and the race and sex of the plaintiff have
stronger impacts on the decision the judge makes in an employment discrimination case
than does the sex or race of the judge. In addition, having more than one female judge on
the panel increases the probability that a vote will be in the plaintiff’s favor, though
having two female judges actually decreases the probability of a favorable vote for the
plaintiff. The results of this study provide support for the informational perspective and
the political model of judicial decision-making. Implications of the results of this study
should be instructive in identifying if, to what extent, and how judges’ political biases,
both subconscious and overt, are influencing their judicial decision-making processes.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (hereinafter referred to as “Title VII;” 42 U.S.C.
§§2000e to 2000e-17; Pub.L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, H.R. 7152), originally signed into law
by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, prohibits discrimination in employment
decisions based on sex, race, national origin, and religion. This act also created the Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (hereinafter referred to as “EEOC;” 42 U.S.C.
§§2000e to 2000e-17). Age, disability, and pregnancy were not classified as protected
statuses under the original bill; these protections were added to Title VII later through
separate acts.
In the fifty years since this law was enacted, dramatic changes in the workplace in
the United States have occurred. More women have joined the workforce than ever. From
1950 to 2000, the proportion of women in the labor force increased from 34 percent to 60
percent in 2000 (Toossi 2002). The most recently available data demonstrates that 56.8
percent of the workers in the labor force in 2016 were women (United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2016). Despite the fact that women now comprise the majority of
employees in the labor force, there are still notable differences in the ways women are
treated in the workplace compared to men. These differences manifest in numerous ways,
including the gender pay gap (Altonji and Blank 1999), gender segregation (Altonji and
Blank 1999), discrimination against women in personnel decisions (Housh 2011), and
sexual harassment (Housh 2011; Juliano and Schwab 2000).
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While one of the United States’ basic founding principles is that all are equal in
the eyes of the law, research determining whether this is the case with respect to many
different characteristics has produced mixed results (Allen and Wall 1993; Boyd, Epstein,
and Martin 2010; Peresie 2005; among others). Rights may depend on the zip code one
lives in. Research testing whether rulings in various types of judicial cases vary based
upon the region of the country have produced mixed results (Guthrie and Roth 1999;
Peresie 2005). In addition, the degree to which personal characteristics of the judge and
the plaintiff play a role in how judges rule in cases dealing with sex discrimination has
not been conclusively determined.
While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a whole addresses discrimination in many
venues of public life (such as housing, voting, and access to public services) as a result of
a variety of identity characteristics (such as race, national origin, and religion), this study
is limited to discussing the effects of judicial decision-making on sex discrimination
lawsuits filed under Title VII. This research focuses on determining what characteristics
play a role in the outcome of cases alleging sex discrimination in the federal courts.
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following questions:
1. Is there any difference in decisions in cases dealing with employment
discrimination based on sex as a result of such factors as sex of the judge, race
of the judge, geographic location of the suit, or the political ideology of the
judge? Are there any interaction effects noted among these characteristics?
2. Is there any difference in decisions in cases dealing with sex discrimination in
employment as a result of such factors as the sex or race of the plaintiff?
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Most of the available peer-reviewed studies view the topic through a sociological
lens with little attention to the effects of the judiciary on employment discrimination
complaints (e.g., Covarrubias 2013; Reskin 2000), or through a judicial lens with
emphasis on qualitative analysis of lawsuit filings (e.g., Davis 1992; Duncan and Loretto
2004). There has been little attempt to integrate the fields of sociological theory and legal
theory into analyses of discrimination cases using a quantitative approach, though some
examples do exist (Schlanger and Kim 2014; Suchman and Edelman 1996; Edelman and
Suchman 2007).
This paper adds to the small body of literature examining legal issues using a
sociological framework. There have been some examinations of sex discrimination in the
workplace from a legal viewpoint in the sociological literature (Edelman 1992; Edelman,
Fuller and Mara-Drita 2001; Edelman, Krieger, Eliason, Albiston and Mellema 2011).
However, most of this research tends to examine the issue through examination of
EEOC-1 filings (e.g., Covarrubias 2013; Reskin 2000), which do not track complaints of
discrimination, but rather collect data on the demographic makeup of the workplace. A
comprehensive search revealed only a few papers that specifically examined the
determinants of the results of EEOC lawsuits brought before federal court. Some of these
papers have not been peer-reviewed or formally published (Hirsh and Cha 2014). Others
analyzed areas of law other than or in addition to employment discrimination, possibly
confounding the results since different types of cases rely upon different statutes and
precedent-setting case law and also deal with fundamentally different issues (e.g., Sisk,
Heise and Morriss 1998; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Still others studied only cases
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brought by the EEOC, rather than cases brought by both private plaintiffs and the EEOC,
which reduces the sample size drastically, thereby possibly biasing the results (Besley
and Payne 2003; Schlanger et al. 2009). This paper updates the literature by using
lawsuits filed by both the EEOC and private plaintiffs, adding additional variables to the
dataset based on content analysis of initial pleadings and/or decisions, and analyzing
these issues through a sociological lens.
Understanding the impact judicial actions can have on sex discrimination in the
workplace is crucial for policymakers, employees and employers alike. The recent
revelation of numerous allegations of sexual harassment made against media mogul
Harvey Weinstein demonstrates the continued importance of continuing efforts to
eliminate discrimination from the workplace. Ashley Judd, an actress, has alleged that
Weinstein invited her to a hotel in Beverly Hills for what she anticipated would be a
business meeting. Upon her arrival, however, Weinstein allegedly invited Judd into his
hotel room, where “he appeared in a bathrobe and asked if he could give her a massage or
she would watch him shower” (Kantor and Twohey 2017).
The sexualization of female employees and perpetuation of gender stereotypes are
constantly reproduced by interaction, play a significant role in the formation of societal
norms, and can have lasting psychological effects both on the target of the stereotyping
and the perpetrator, as well as society as a whole (Abrams 1994). In addition, these sorts
of stereotypes can have deleterious effects on women’s career trajectories. As the quote
from the New York Times above clearly demonstrates, there is continued reason for
concern about the fate of women and other minorities in the workplace. Understanding
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the forces that play a role in judicial decision-making can assist attorneys in providing
sound advice to their clients and developing a compelling case for each of their clients in
order to ensure the best possible outcome. If judges are in fact biased either as a result of
their personal identity characteristics, political characteristics, or both, they can be made
aware of those biases and work to ensure that these biases do not unduly affect the
judicial decision-making process. Only through empirical data can policymakers be
convinced to act in a manner which will be more conducive to equality of opportunity for
all in the workplace. This paper will also assist in developing a framework for empirical
study of legal issues using a sociological lens.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Background
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains eleven sections, or Titles, each addressing
a different aspect of public life and setting forth the rights of individuals protected under
the Act, as well as means of enforcement. Title VII is the portion of the Act with which
this study is concerned. As originally passed into law, Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees or candidates for employment based on race, color,
national origin, sex, or religion. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967)
added protection for workers based on age (29 U.S.C. §§621 to 634). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Act (1972) strengthened protections for
individuals covered under the Acts passed to date, and also authorized the EEOC to bring
suit on a claimant’s behalf (Pub.L. 92−261, 86 Stat. 103, H.R. 1746). Later expansions in
1978 added protections for pregnant women and new mothers (Pub. L. No. 95-555, §1,
92 Stat. 2076, S. 995) and persons with disabilities in 1990 (42 U.S.C. §12101). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 is a particularly relevant addition to Title VII in
terms of its protections and impacts on increasing labor force participation for women,
since the largest increase in labor force participation among women has been among
married women and mothers (e.g., Blau and Kahn 2007).
Prevalence of Discrimination
Since 1970, the EEOC has received an average of approximately 80,000 claims
per year (Besley and Payne 2003). EEOC charge data from 2001 reveals that 31 percent
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of charges involved allegations of sex discrimination, 36 percent of charges involved
allegations of discrimination based on race, 20 percent based on age, and 20 percent
based on disability. Across these categories, between 18 and 26 percent of those cases
were closed without further investigation, usually because the claimant failed to provide
requested information or withdrew the claim. For charges that do receive a full
investigation, between 55 and 63 percent of the time, the EEOC did not find sufficient
evidence of discrimination. These cases, therefore, are candidates for lawsuits and are
under consideration here. The remaining cases are either settled, or the EEOC does find
sufficient evidence of discrimination and levies penalties upon the employer (Besley and
Payne 2003).
While the EEOC does reserve the right to file suit in federal court on a claimant’s
behalf, they do so very rarely. In 2001, only 32 cases were filed by the EEOC alleging
age discrimination (Besley and Payne 2003). The vast majority of lawsuits filed alleging
discrimination are filed by the claimant (either through counsel, about 80 percent; or pro
se, by themselves without assistance from counsel, about 20 percent; Clermont and
Eisenberg 2002).
Peresie (2005) finds that the vast majority of Title VII plaintiffs lose their cases in
court (also Krieger 1995). Krieger (1995) suggests that this may be due partially to the
fact that most cases alleging employment discrimination are disparate treatment cases,
which have become increasingly difficult to prove as discriminatory attitudes have
shifted over time. The disparate treatment doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove not only
that they were discriminated against based on their membership in a protected class, but
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that the discrimination was overt, intentional, and specifically due to their membership in
the protected class, not attributable to any other cause (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)). Krieger (1995) argues
that when Title VII was first enacted in 1964, overt discrimination was still very much
present in the workplace, and the remedies made available in the legislation were
probably sufficient to reduce the prevalence of overt discrimination.
However, the issue of the continued prevalence of sex- or race-based
discrimination is more nuanced than to say that racism or sexism has decreased.
Researchers have argued, and many court cases bear this out, that discrimination, rather
than going underground or dying off completely, just manifests in new, less immediately
obvious ways (Krieger 2004). Instead, racially or sexually discriminatory attitudes are
manifested subconsciously through implicit bias (Cornell and Welch 1996; Krieger 2004;
Levinson 2007). Implicit bias, in particular, proves to be remarkably persistent despite
best efforts to eliminate or reduce it (Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Greenwald and
Krieger 2006; Jolls and Sunstein 2006; Levinson 2007). Some argue that it has become
much easier, if not too easy, for employer-defendants to present a plausible explanation
for their actions that does not overtly appear discriminatory (Krieger 2004; Norton et al.
2006; Selmi 1996). Krieger argues that the ways in which discrimination is manifested in
workplaces have morphed to the point where the disparate treatment doctrine has become
increasingly inadequate in dealing with discrimination cases in the spirit contemplated by
the original framers (2004; also Flagg 1995), making it more difficult for plaintiffs to
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prevail in court unless the discriminatory behavior they experienced was especially
egregious (Flagg 1995).
Title VII’s passage meant that employers no longer had unlimited latitude to
discriminate against employees or applicants based on certain

demographic

characteristics. It was no longer legal to post signs in the front windows specifying “Help
wanted – no Irish need apply” or to specify in a want ad that candidates for a secretarial
position would not be considered unless they were attractive, unmarried young women.
At the same time, though, the mere passage of Title VII was not enough to change the
minds of employers or eliminate certain notions that they may have held about women or
other minority groups (Bielby and Baron 1986; Blau, Simpson, and Anderson 1998).
The operation of discrimination in a more subtle fashion in contemporary
organizations is exemplified in Wal-Mart vs. Dukes (131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)). A class of
over a million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart filed the action,
asserting that the company’s pay and promotion policy violated Title VII. The plaintiffs
argued that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture encouraged its local managers to use their
discretion in determining pay and promotions in a manner that was discriminatory
towards female employees (Wal-Mart vs. Dukes (131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)).
The plaintiffs entered into evidence statistical evidence of discrimination in terms
of pay and promotions, testimony from several members of the class action, and
testimony from William Bielby, a sociologist specializing in employment discrimination
(Wal-Mart vs. Dukes (131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled
against the plaintiffs, arguing that it was impossible for all million-plus participants in the
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class action to articulate a common experience of discrimination, required in order for a
class action to be certified (Wal-Mart vs. Dukes (131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)). The majority
opinion also noted that Wal-Mart offered evidence that they had a written policy of nondiscrimination which prescribed penalties for violating that policy (Edelman 2011; WalMart vs. Dukes (131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)). If the evidence supports the plaintiffs’
allegations of discrimination on an individual level, it is clear that the courts, to some
degree, accept that employers will sometimes pay lip service to anti-discrimination laws,
even while violating them in less overt ways.
The Judicial Role in the Process
The judiciary plays a pivotal role in the administration of Title VII. Although the
main responsibility for data collection and initial investigation into employment
discrimination claims rests with the EEOC and state agencies, as does the initial
sanctioning of non-compliant employers, the courts are the ultimate remedy for disputes
that cannot be resolved through the administrative dispute resolution process.
The EEOC requires an individual claiming employment discrimination to make
that claim within 180-300 days of the date of the relevant event (EEOC, N.d.). Once the
charge is filed, the EEOC performs a preliminary investigation. If the claim is not
referred to mediation, or if mediation is not successful, a full investigation will take
place. If the EEOC determines that no violation has taken place, a Notice will be issued
to the individual to that effect, affording the individual the right to pursue the issue in
court. If the EEOC determines a violation may have taken place, the agency will attempt
to reach a settlement with the employer. If the EEOC and the employer are unable to
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effect a settlement agreement, the EEOC will determine whether to bring suit on the
individual’s behalf. If the EEOC decides not to bring suit on the individual’s behalf, the
individual will be notified that they have the right to bring suit against the employer
themselves if they wish (EEOC, N.d.). Thus, the courts are the last resort for an
individual wishing to resolve a dispute (Besley and Payne 2003). The administrative
process may take from three to ten months after the charge is filed (EEOC, N.d.). If suit
is filed, full resolution may take years.
If a case is filed in court, a trial court initially assumes jurisdiction. If the state
statute affords more protection to the individual than the federal statute, the individual
has the option of filing suit in state court. In certain cases, cases filed in state court may
be transferred to federal court. As the laws in each state are slightly different, this study
considers only cases which have been filed in federal court.
At the federal level, the trial court is one of the 94 federal district courts. The
district court, as the only court with original jurisdiction, is the only court authorized to
hear, interpret, and weigh the facts of the case. The appellate courts and the Supreme
Court are only authorized to determine whether the lower court’s application of the law is
incorrect; they are not permitted to resolve issues of errors of fact. Out of roughly 7,000
requests for review the Supreme Court receives each year, it only agrees to hear between
100 and 150 cases (uscourts.gov, N.d.). If the Supreme Court rejects the appeal, the
finding of the appellate court becomes binding. Since the vast majority of appeals filed
from appellate court decisions to the Supreme Court are rejected, the power of the
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appellate court in driving trends in employment discrimination litigation, and subsequent
implications for public policy, cannot be understated (Cross 2003).
The federal court system is divided geographically into thirteen judicial circuits,
twelve of which are composed of one or more U.S. states and territories, plus a “Federal
Circuit” which handles certain appeals from the other circuits. Except for the D.C. Circuit
(only containing the District of Columbia), each state is geographically subdivided into
one or more districts, depending on population. South Carolina, for instance, only has one
federal district, while California and New York each have four districts. Since the Federal
Circuit does not handle discrimination complaints, this circuit will not be considered
further.
Theoretical Perspectives
This study uses Dorsen’s social background theory (Sisk et al. 1998) to explain
how various demographic characteristics color individual attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviors. Acker’s (2006) gendered organization theory applies Dorsen’s social
background theory in a more focused exploration of how gender norms, beliefs, and
attitudes are reproduced in the workplace and ultimately, the greater society.
Intersectionality theory (Abrams 1994; Areheart 2006; Crenshaw 1989, Crenshaw 1991)
extends Dorsen’s social background theory to race, and examines how the intersection of
multiple identities (for instance, gender, race, and national origin) can combine in
different ways in different individuals to privilege or disadvantage each individual in a
unique manner.
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In order to specifically examine the effects that judges’ demographic
characteristics have on their decision-making in employment discrimination cases, two
frameworks will be used: the four perspectives of minority identities in jurisprudence (the
different voice, the informational, the representational, and the organizational
perspectives) and the four theories of judicial decision-making: the legal, the political, the
strategic, and the litigant-driven models (Cross 2003).
Social Background Theory and Identities in the Workplace
Employees hold beliefs and attitudes about gender role expectations and
expectations regarding attitudes and behavior in all arenas in life, including the
workplace (Acker 2006; Benschop and Doorewaard 1998; Kanter 1977; Ridgeway 1997).
These expectations are internalized by individuals as part of the socialization process
from infancy forward (Acker 2006; Ashforth and Mael 1989). The socialization process
includes the formation of stereotypes about how men and women are expected to act,
think and believe (Acker 2006; Benschop and Doorewaard 1998; Biernat and
Kobrynowicz 1997; Housh 2011), and prescribe various forms of formal and informal
social control for violation of these norms (Housh 2011; Ridgeway 1997). Discrimination
is, in some circumstances, one consequence of noncompliance with societal norms. For
instance,

employment

discrimination

may

be

considered

a

consequence

of

noncompliance with societal norms in the case of a female attorney with family
responsibilities being denied partner status on the (stated) grounds that she does not
generate enough billable hours, while a male candidate who happens to be a father may
be granted partnership despite having a similar amount of billable hours due to the
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anticipation that he will desire the higher pay afforded to partners because of his family
responsibilities.
These attitudes, expectations, and behaviors, as they are carried out by individuals
through everyday interaction, are but one of many forces shaping behavior at the
organizational level (Acker 2006; Benschop and Doorewaard 1998; Ridgeway 1997).
These actions and behaviors influence the attitudes and opinions of employees in
development of an organizational culture, which spreads from employer to employer by
way of various mechanisms (Acker 2006; Benschop and Doorewaard 1998) including
interaction with clients or customers, vendors and other individuals as part of one’s work
tasks, and employees moving from company to company. There are serious ramifications
of the gendering of organizations for employees of both genders, including differences in
the allocation of work among employees, differences in pay and work hours, differences
in access to promotion and training opportunities, and differences in how the work
environment is experienced and perceived (Acker 2006; Housh 2011).
Acker (2006) delineated four different types of processes in which workplace
arrangements could be gendered: structural arrangements, cultural arrangements,
interactions, and identity formation. Each of these processes operates at a different level
of the social world, and each process interacts with the others in order to produce a world
in which gender operates at and colors all levels of the social world.
Gender is reproduced in terms of such personnel decisions as job allocation,
promotion, and termination (Acker 2006; Benschop and Doorewaard 1998).
Occupational segregation describes the mechanisms by which men and women are sorted
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into occupations and positions within those occupations, and the extent to which this
occurs (e.g., Bielby and Baron 1986). Many explanations for occupational segregation
have been proposed through the years, including differences between employers in how
men and women are allocated to positions and differences between men and women in
the same organization with respect to the rank or responsibilities of their positions
(Bielby and Baron 1986, Halaby 1979).
While women and racial minorities have made great strides in increasing their
representation both in the courts and in occupations more generally, there is still a long
way to go before true parity will be achieved. In 1977, only two women were serving in
the federal appellate courts (Davis, Haire, and Songer 1993), inspiring President Carter to
reform the appointment process (Clinton 1996, Gottschall 1983). As of 2016, only 60 out
of 167 active judges, or 36 percent, in the federal appellate courts were female (National
Women’s Law Center 2016). As of June 2017, 75 percent of judges in federal courts
were white, 13 percent were African-American, 9 percent were Hispanic and the
remaining 3 percent were Asian-American (McMillion 2017).
Considering each circuit individually reveals even more striking discrepancies.
Only 17 percent of the judges in the Third Circuit are women (National Women’s Law
Center 2016). As of June 1, 2017, the Eighth Circuit only had one active female judge out
of nine active judges (McMillion 2017). There is at least one African-American judge on
the federal bench in each circuit except for the Federal Circuit (McMillion 2017). At least
one active Hispanic judge serves in eleven out of thirteen circuits (McMillion 2017).
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Asian-American judges are currently active in five out of thirteen districts (McMillion
2017).
Gender also colors organizational experience through the formation of
organizational culture. Organizational culture is defined as the collection of shared
understandings, values, symbols, and formal and informal rules that a group possesses.
As Benschop and Doorewaard (1998) point out, development of an organizational culture
is one manifestation of the influence of gender role expectations and attitudes upon a
culture. This is demonstrated clearly by the trope of the “good ol’ boy” network prevalent
in many industries favoring the hiring and promotion of men over women, as well as the
extent to which sexual harassment is tolerated within a particular organization.
Closely related to organizational culture is organizational identity. Ashforth and
Mael (1989) drew upon Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory to explain how
organizational identity, an outgrowth of organizational culture, is formed. Social identity
theory stipulates that individuals identify with one or more defining characteristics in
order to help them make sense of themselves, others, and their place within society
(Ashforth and Mael 1989). These defining characteristics can include sex, race, and age,
among others. These are reproduced on a grander scale in an organization, as each
individual brings their social identity, along with its associated beliefs, attitudes, and
expectations, to work with them every day.
A related process, social cognition theory, posits that individuals sort themselves
and others into in-groups and out-groups based upon one or more defining identity
characteristics (Reskin 2000). This categorization involves the processes of stereotyping
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and implicit versus explicit bias (Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Krieger 1995; Reskin
2000; Ridgeway 1997). The process of organizational identification operates similarly to
the process of individual identity formation. Organizational identification begins with a
collection of members who see themselves as part of a group. The tendency for
individuals to desire to identify with a group increases with the distinctiveness of the
group’s values and practices in relation to other groups, the extent of social closure, the
prestige of the group, and the salience of the out-group(s), or the extent to which the ingroup is aware of and consciously compares itself to the out-group(s) (Ashforth and Mael
1989).
As a result of comparisons individuals make between groups, opinions about the
relative worth and status of the groups are formed (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Sex
differentiation is a fundamental process leading to the creation of hierarchies, as
individuals compare themselves to others and form groups with those similar to
themselves (Krieger 1995; Ridgeway 1997). Since gender is almost always relevant to
any given situation (Acker 2006), gender is one of the lowest-level characteristics under
which a hierarchy may form (Reskin 2000; Ridgeway 1997). Once organizational
identification takes place, groups rank themselves and other groups as a way to locate
themselves within society, creating conflict between groups as they jockey for status and
power (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Once groups are ordered in status/power hierarchies,
the in-groups establish their dominance over out-groups through the development of
negative stereotypes about the out-groups and its members, and maintenance of social
distance between the groups. These stereotypes become pervasive and can have
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significant effects on members of both in-groups and out-groups (Ashforth and Mael
1989). Krieger (1995) points out that many of these stereotypes drive decision-making
and thought processes at the cognitive, unconscious level rather than consciously.
In addition to operating at the organizational level, identity formation also
functions at the individual level and at the level of interaction between two individuals.
Identity is formed within the individual as a result of the socialization process, involving
the passing down of values, attitudes, behaviors, norms, and beliefs from parent to child.
Socialization, in turn, influences numerous aspects of one’s life both in terms of
individual actions, thoughts, behaviors and beliefs, and how those actions, thoughts,
behaviors and beliefs are manifested in interaction between others. Using Acker’s
gendered organization framework, one realizes why until very recently, many
organizations maintained a strict hierarchy with white men occupying the top managerial
positions, while women and people of color occupied the lower-prestige, lower-paying,
less interesting administrative positions (2006).
In their study, Benschop and Doorewaard (2000) described three manifestations
of the gendering of Dutch banking culture. Most relevant to the discussion of the role
gender plays in how judges make decisions in sex discrimination cases is the concept of
the token, in which women occupying top positions within the banks are paraded
unwittingly as “show pieces.” (Kanter 1977; Krieger 1995)
Kanter (1977) originally described the token woman who manages to succeed at
her job despite the albatross of her gender hanging around her neck. The token is seen as
representative of her group, and is made to feel that she must work twice as hard and
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achieve more and better results than everyone else to be seen as half as capable or
competent (Benschop and Doorewaard 1998; Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Krieger
1995). Benschop and Doorewaard found several examples of organizations loudly
trumpeting the accomplishments of their successful female employees: “We have this one
woman in our department. She has a high position and she is our pride and joy
(2000:782).” They interpreted this statement as the organization’s attempt to signal to
outsiders their tolerance, acceptance, and pride in their maintenance of gender diversity
within the workplace (2000). On the other hand, most examples of tokenism serve to
paint the token as “other.” Being a woman in a typically male-dominated industry (for
example, engineering) may, on one hand, make it easier for her to obtain employment.
On the other hand, it may cause others to question the woman’s competence, or to
wonder if the only reason for the hiring of the woman was to meet arbitrary diversity
metrics (Powell, Bagilhole, and Dainty 2009).
Organizational culture acts in concert with other social trends to influence judicial
opinion (Edelman et al. 2011). This process operates relatively invisibly to the lay
observer and can be difficult to operationalize in terms of specific, measurable criteria
(Edelman et al. 2011). Therefore, many researchers, especially in the legal field, tend to
employ a qualitative analysis approach, examining a few representative cases and
attempting, with varying degrees of success, to generalize to the broader population.
For decades, many scholars examining the relationship between judges’ personal
characteristics and judicial decision-making took for granted the assumption that personal
characteristics of the judge played some role in the decision-making process and
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ideological trends displayed in a particular judge’s body of work (Danelski 1965; Gibson
1978; Grossman 1966; Murphy 1964; Schmidhauser 1959; Sisk and Heise 2004; Sisk,
Heise, and Morriss 1998). There has certainly been no shortage of work providing
empirical evidence that such characteristics as sex (Davis, Haire, and Songer 1993;
Krieger 2004; Songer, Davis, and Haire 1994), race (Gottschall 1983; Steffensmeier and
Hebert 1999; Uhlman 1978), religious beliefs (Songer and Tabrizi 1999), region of the
country in which the suit is brought (Guthrie and Roth 1999; Peresie 1995; Stiglitz 2014)
and political party to which the appointing president belongs (Davis et al. 1993, Segal et
al. 1995; Stidham, Rowland and Carp 1983) play a role in judicial decision-making.
Most of this research is grounded in Dorsen’s social background theory (Sisk et
al. 1998), one of the four perspectives of minority identities in judicial decision-making
(Allen and Wall 1993; Peresie 2005) or one of the four models of judicial decisionmaking (Cross 2003). Dorsen’s social background theory posits that personal
characteristics of a judge such as race, gender, religion, and national origin, among
others, shape the judge’s values and beliefs and colors the ways that the judge views and
applies the law to judicial decisions (Sisk et al. 1998). On the other hand, other
researchers have found no or weak relationships between judicial outcomes and gender
(Ashenfelter, Eisenberg and Schwab 1995; Segal 2000).
Four Perspectives of Minority Identities in Judicial Decision-Making
Gilligan (1982) used developmental psychology theory to explain differences
between the sexes. She proposed that throughout society, women were usually viewed as
the mirror image of men, rather than individual human beings in their own right, and
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were fundamentally different than men physiologically, intellectually, and emotionally
(Davis et al. 1993; Gilligan 1982; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). As a result of these
differences, men and women are thought to use different approaches to resolve problems
and make decisions (Gilligan 1982; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). According to
Gilligan, men view the world in individualistic terms and define themselves through
competition against others for power, prestige, and resources, while women employ a
more collective, collaborative viewpoint that prioritizes the greater good over gains for a
particular individual or group (Davis et al. 1993; Gilligan 1982). Gilligan thus criticized
the basic conception of a male individual that underpinned much psychological research
to date (Chamallas 1994; Gilligan 1982).
Applied to judicial decision-making, Gilligan’s proposal implies that men take a
dim view of discrimination cases, and view discrimination as a result of some personal
failing within the individual, not systemic issues. The out-group, here, would be female
judges and litigants, and the in-group would be male judges and litigants, as well as
employers generally. Under this theory, female judges (the out-group) may be more
likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs asserting their right to full participation in society due
to differences in how men and women construe their world and make decisions (Davis et
al. 1993; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Gilligan’s theory asserts that female judges
“bring a ‘feminine perspective’ to the bench” (Boyd et al. 2010:390). This feminine
perspective takes into account all points of view, not just the majority view. Under this
theory, while there may be differences in rulings made by a single judge, there is not
likely to be a difference in panel rulings since decisions are made by each judge

21

independently, and the majority opinion is the one taken as the ultimate decision (Boyd et
al. 2010).
However, the different voice theory has come under fire from some scholars who
believe that Gilligan’s approach essentializes women by proposing that all women
approach tasks from a more relational standpoint than all men, and that women’s
personality characteristics leading to a more relational approach are fixed over time
(Kahn and Yoder 1989; Kulik et al. 1996). In one empirical study of the extent to which
the different voice theory operated in the courtroom, Kulik et al. (1996) found that the
relationship was more complex than Gilligan implied. While Kulik’s (1996) study found
gender-related effects in the perceived fairness of the ultimate outcome, there were no
statistically significant gender-related effects in variables dealing with procedural justice
(specific elements relating to the processing of the court case, such as fairness of the rules
themselves and the application of those rules). They also found that women judges tended
to be more outcome-oriented than men judges (Kulik et al. 1996).
Others argue that the different voice theory ignores individual variation within
women (Fox and Van Sickel 2000; Karlan and Ortiz 1992). In a study seeking to
determine the extent to which the different voice perspective played a role in state
criminal cases, Fox and Van Sickel (2000) found that both male and female judges
exhibited traits commonly ascribed to both genders. For instance, some male judges
ensured that the defendant had ample opportunity to present their side of the story and
elicited as many details about the defendant’s personal context as possible before making
a decision, both traits more commonly associated with women (Fox and Van Sickel
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2000). At the same time, some female judges sternly lectured defendants about the error
of their ways and handed down harsher sentences than the prosecution requested, traits
more typically associated with men (Fox and Van Sickel 2000).
Similar to the different voice perspective, the informational perspective also notes
the importance of the female voice and perspective in making judicial decisions (Boyd et
al. 2010; Peresie 2005). However, the informational perspective lifts up the significance
of the female voice to a new level by suggesting that the presence of a female judge on a
panel influences decisions made by her male colleagues to an extent not possible on a
sex-homogenous panel (Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005). Under this theory, a plaintiff
would be more likely to receive a favorable ruling in a sex discrimination case if there is
at least one woman on the panel (Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005).
Other researchers argue that female judges act as a representative of women’s
viewpoints on issues salient to women, such as reproductive rights, sexual assault, and
sex discrimination, and thus are more likely to rule in female plaintiffs’ favor in cases
dealing specifically with these issues (Allen and Wall 1993; Boyd et al. 2010; Ridgeway
1997). Similarly to the informational role, the presence and viewpoint of the female judge
exerts a subtle influence on her male counterparts on the panel. However, with respect to
non-gendered issues, the specific influence of the female judge’s sex has little, if any,
effect on the outcome of the case (Allen and Wall 1993; Boyd et al. 2010).
Finally, the organizational perspective argues that there are no essential
differences in how men and women resolve problems and make decisions (Kulik et al.
1996; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Under this perspective, how judges make
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decisions in cases is based solely upon their judicial training and the demands of the
judicial field: sound jurisprudence and logical reasoning, impartiality, the norms within
the field, and their commitment to justice within the bounds of the law (Cross 2003;
Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Identity characteristics such as sex and race play no role
in judicial decision-making in this perspective.
The Four Models of Judicial Decision-Making
In order to explain how judges make decisions in cases, legal scholars often rely
upon one or more of the four basic models of judicial decision-making: the legal,
political, strategic, and litigant-driven models. Each of these models posits that a different
factor is the main driving force behind each decision a judge makes in a case. In keeping
with the findings of Cross (2003), most discussion will be devoted to the first two
models, with only a cursory discussion of the other models.
The legal model proposes that judges rely only upon a value-neutral application of
existing case law, relevant statutes, and sound legal reasoning when making decisions in
cases (Cross 2003; Kulik et al. 1996; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Judges turn off
their ideological preferences and mute outside pressures, and make decisions according to
a strict systematic, logical thought process and reliance upon precedent and properly
introduced evidence (Cross 2003; Kulik et al. 1996; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999;
Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman 2004). Taken to its extremes, the legal model argues that
these principles apply at all levels of judicial decision-making, not only in terms of the
final ruling, but also in terms of deciding whether or not to grant motions, determining
time frames for scheduling of hearings and deadlines for motions, briefs, and other
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filings, or allowing a certain item to be introduced into evidence (Cross 2003).
Incremental decisions made earlier in a case’s history may have a significant impact on
the ultimate outcome of the case (Hunter 2008). The most extreme example involves a
decision on whether to grant a motion to dismiss the case; however, decisions on whether
to admit a certain piece of evidence or even scheduling issues could ultimately have a
significant impact on the outcome of the case as a whole if the case ultimately turned on
that particular aspect.
The legal model has been bound up with the Western ideal of justice as wholly
objective and impartial so tightly that it is almost anathema for any judge to imply that
personal characteristics play any role in their decision-making. For example, Justice Felix
Frankfurter, an Austrian immigrant and only the second Jewish justice in the history of
the Supreme Court, opined in his dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education et al.
v. Barnette et al. that:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not
likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my
purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with
the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion. . . . But as judges we are
neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal
attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by our judicial
obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the latest
immigrants to these shores. As a member of this Court I am not justified in
writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how
deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard
(Emphasis mine; 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
The main problem with applying the legal model to the question under
consideration here, using a quantitative approach, should be obvious at this point. Under
this model, cases are to be considered solely on their merits according to objective
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criteria and examination of every minute detail in the case. It would be impossible to
develop variables to encompass every minute detail in enough cases to meet restrictions
on sample size and missing data, and to compare those hundreds or thousands of
variables meaningfully across cases. At best, evidence of the operation of the legal model
may be suggested by the low levels of influence of the other three models.
The legal model theory has come under fire in recent years from numerous
researchers (e.g., Cross 2003:1465) arguing that to presume that judges are capable of
completely removing their subconscious bias from the equation when making decisions is
“naïve.” On the other hand, one must presume that subconscious bias or outside pressures
operate to some extent; the main question is what is operating and to what extent.
Clearly, judges do not write in their opinions that they “ruled for the plaintiff because
[they are] a liberal” (Cross 2003:1464) or admit that any factor other than those espoused
in the legal model of judicial decision-making played a role in the judge’s decision. To do
otherwise would run afoul of cultural and professional norms. As part of his or her oath
of office, a judge is required to swear that they will uphold the law in an impartial
manner. However, evidence that other factors may be playing a role may exist in judges’
private notes, memoirs or interviews.
In contrast to the legal model, the political model presumes that judicial opinions
are influenced by the ideological views of their writers, possibly in an attempt to drive
public policy in a certain direction (Cross 2003, Murphy 1964). Here, judges act in their
capacity as part of the political process. While judges are not elected to office at the
federal level, they are appointed by presidents who themselves have political and
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ideological agendas they wish to promote. Under this model, while judges are still
involved in a systematic application of legal principles and precedent, the precedent they
choose to employ in justifying their decision may be selected based on the particular
viewpoint the judge wishes to further, rather than strictly on its applicability to the case
under consideration.
Cross and Tiller (1998) found that the presence of a judge with diverging
ideological opinions in the minority (a “whistleblower”) had an influence on the extent to
which those siding with the majority adhered to generally accepted tenets of legal
decision-making. The presence of a whistleblower almost doubled the chances that the
majority opinion will involve proper application of the Chevron doctrine (Cross and
Tiller 1998). However, the court cases Cross and Tiller (1998) examined (decisions from
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals from 1991-1995 citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc.) differ substantially from cases dealing with sex
discrimination in employment.
One case decision supporting the operation of the political model is reviewed in
Graycar’s (2008) examination of accusations of bias sometimes levied against non-white
male judges. Graycar uses the example of RDS vs. R to illustrate the difference between
“neutrality” and “impartiality” with respect to judicial decision-making, and argues that
true neutrality (i.e., pure objectivity) is most likely impossible due to the omnipresent
influence that identity characteristics play in individuals’ lives.
RDS vs. R involved a Black teenager in Nova Scotia accused of interfering with
the arrest of another youth (Graycar 2008). Judge Corinne Sparks (a Black woman)
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originally dismissed the case, noting in her oral argument that “. . .I am not saying the
police officer overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, especially when
dealing with non-white groups. . . . And I do accept the evidence of [RDS] that he was
told to shut up or he would be under arrest. It seems to be in keeping with the prevalent
attitude of the day” (RDS vs. R [1997] 3 SCR 484, quoted in Graycar 2008:74). In their
appeal to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, the prosecution successfully argued that Judge
Sparks exhibited bias in her decision, only to be later overturned by the Supreme Court of
Canada (Graycar 2008). Writing for the majority, Justices Claire L’Heureux-Dube and
Beverly McLachlin acknowledged that it would be impossible for judges to completely
ignore the experiences that molded them, but that it was possible and desirable for judges
to employ a standard of impartiality in their decision-making:
… [T]he test for reasonable apprehension of bias [. . .] is reflective of the reality
that while judges can never be neutral, in the sense of purely objective, they can
and must strive for impartiality. It therefore recognizes as inevitable and
appropriate that the differing experiences of judges assist them in their
decision-making process and will be reflected in their judgments, so long as
those experiences are relevant to the cases, are not based on inappropriate
stereotypes, and do not prevent a fair and just determination of the cases
based on the facts in evidence. (Emphasis mine; Graycar 2008:75-6)
In reviewing public correspondence from Supreme Court Justices Louis D.
Brandeis and Pierce Butler, Danelski (1965) found that Justice Brandeis most often
invoked the values of individual freedom, practicality, and change in his correspondence,
while Justice Butler preferred to refer to morality, patriotism, and tradition in his
correspondence. These findings were then compared to rulings in which each judge was
the sole dissenter on the court (Danelski 1965). Indeed, Danelski (1965) found that
Justice Brandeis never dissented in favor of a more stringent laissez-faire position, while
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Justice Butler, on the other hand, never dissented in favor of a less strong laissez-faire
position, generally in line with their ideological stance.
The political model could possibly be expanded to take into account not only
ideological preferences, but also identity characteristics such as sex, age, and race
(Sunstein et al. 2004). Other research examining the relationship between sex, race, and
age, and judicial decision-making is generally framed in terms of the four perspectives of
minority identities in the judiciary (see Allen and Wall 1993; Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie
2005; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999, among others). This paper, in essence, seeks to
determine whether the political model may be expanded to take into account identity
characteristics.
The strategic model posits that the main factor driving judicial decision-making is
the judge’s desire to prevent their decisions from being overturned by a higher court
(Cross 2003) or Congress (Murphy 1964; Webber 2015). Under this model, judges craft
their decisions so as to make them as appeal-proof as possible. On its face, it is
reasonable to assume that judges would be interested in seeing as few of their cases
overturned as possible, especially at the lower levels. Judges with many overturned
decisions may not be viewed as favorably as judges with no overturned decisions. Judges
may be interested in their decisions standing as often as possible stand in order to
position themselves for a more prestigious position down the road; having many cases
overturned would not position them favorably for such pursuits. Judges may therefore
strategize their decision-writing to maximize their own benefits, in accordance with
rational choice theory (Brace and Hall 1997; Cross 2003; Murphy 1964). A judge ruling
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in a strategic manner thus prioritizes their own self-interest above their judicial duty to
uphold the law.
Applying the strategic model to the issue here reveals one problem with this
argument. The cases under consideration here are cases at the U.S. Court of Appeals
level. At the appellate level, the judge may not take into consideration any allegation of
error in fact; the appellate judge is only permitted to consider whether the law was
applied correctly in the district court’s decision. Further, the only court higher than the
U.S. Court of Appeals is the Supreme Court. The vast majority of appeals from appellate
court decisions to the Supreme Court are not accepted for hearing (uscourts.gov, N.d.).
Therefore, in the majority of cases, the appellate court decision becomes binding. At least
with the data used in this study, this model should not play much, if any, role in
explaining judicial decision-making.
Cross (2003) also argues that there are practical reasons the strategic model may
not provide the best explanation for judges’ decision-making. Due to the heavy caseloads
most judges typically have at any one time and the insufficient information the judges
have about the appropriate course of action to take strategically in order to further their
own goals, there simply is not enough time or manpower to craft a strategic decision in
each case that would further the judges’ personal goals.
The final approach to judicial decision-making, the litigant-driven approach,
argues that the main force driving judges’ decision to rule in a certain way is actually not
the judge’s actions, but the litigants’ actions. Courts are not permitted to act in a given
situation unless it is given authority to do so by some party, whether it be a plaintiff filing
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a lawsuit or a district attorney bringing an indictment against a defendant. Once a case
reaches the court, the majority of civil cases reach settlement prior to a final judicial
decision, and the majority of criminal cases similarly reach a plea agreement prior to trial
(Gross and Syverud 1996). This is more efficient in the majority of cases for practical
reasons of time and money. Therefore, the few cases that do reach the judge’s bench for a
final determination are more likely to drive case law going forward (Cross 2003).
Judicial Independence in Rendering Decisions
Studies attempting to tease out the factors associated with judicial decisionmaking have produced conflicting results. Several methodological reasons exist for this.
First, civil rights law differs fundamentally from other types of law in terms of precedent,
legal doctrine, and applicable case law (Clermont and Eisenberg 2002). Many of the
existing research includes cases of many different types in their datasets, including
criminal cases, contract cases, and other types of torts, which may confound the results.
Since comparatively few studies have been performed specifically examining the
influences of personal characteristics on judicial decision-making in solely employment
discrimination cases, one should not read too much into findings that gender makes little
or no difference in judicial decision-making in criminal cases.
Second, until roughly thirty years ago, there have been comparatively few women
judges or judges of color (Gruhl, Spohn and Welch 1981; McMillion 2017; National
Women’s Law Center 2016). Therefore, studies indicating no statistically significant
differences in judicial decision-making based on demographic characteristics may in fact
be biased due to the small amount of gender and racial variation in the sample.
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Third, some studies examine relatively small subsections of the population; for
example, employment discrimination plaintiffs in the District of Maryland (Brown 2010),
cases in which the U.S. Forest Service is a party (Keele et al. 2009), cases brought by
asylum-seekers in the Ninth Circuit (Law 2005), or cases from the Fourth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits only (Songer and Sheehan 1992). The extent to which findings from
these studies may be extrapolated to a larger population is unknown.
With respect to employment discrimination specifically, Brown (2010) points out
that a major stumbling block that may be unintentionally biasing findings concerns how
“success” in a case is defined. Since the majority of cases reach settlement prior to a final
judicial decision (Brown 2010), if one confines their definition of success to only those
cases in which a final judicial decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the findings
could be biased due to the small sample size. Also, the sample could be biased if cases
that go to trial are fundamentally different in some manner from those settling prior to
final judicial decision.
Finally, a significant portion of the work examining judicial decision-making is
qualitative and published in law journals, which may or may not be peer-reviewed. While
obviously qualitative research is a legitimate mode of inquiry, and one that is particularly
suited to the legal field in general, due to the difficulty of transforming legal doctrine,
applicable case law, and other legal variables into a quantifiable format, generalizability
will always be an open question with qualitative research due to sample size restrictions.
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Gender in the Courtroom
Female judges may hold a more sympathetic view towards female plaintiffs in
discrimination cases than male judges, simply because of the shared similarity of
experiences of discrimination in the workplace that men do not share. Several researchers
have found evidence supporting this contention (Boyd et al. 2010, Davis et al. 1993;
Farhang and Wawro 2004; Peresie 2005; Songer et al. 1994). Other researchers have
found either no differences between female and male judges with respect to their
tendency to rule for the plaintiff, or that female judges impose even harsher sentences
than male judges (Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Kulik et al. 1996; Segal 2000; Segal et al.
1995; Sisk et al. 1998; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999).
Several researchers have found that female judges were more likely to rule for the
plaintiff in employment discrimination cases than male judges (Allen and Wall 1993,
with respect to state Supreme Court justices; Boyd et al. 2010; Davis et al. 1993 and
Songer et al. 1994, considering U.S. Appeals Court judges). Peresie (2005) found that
while plaintiffs in discrimination cases were overall more likely to lose their cases than
win them, they were twice as likely to win their cases when a female judge rendered the
verdict, and that the presence of the female judge on the panel significantly increased the
probability that a male judge would find for the plaintiff, suggesting that both the
different voice and the informational perspectives play a role. Similarly, Farhang and
Wawro (2004) found that decisions were more likely to be favorable for the plaintiff
when the judging panel contained both men and women than if the panel was all-male,
also suggestive of the informational perspective.
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However, some researchers have found that female judges are actually less likely
to rule in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Using a matched-pairs
strategy of analyzing voting behavior of federal district court judges appointed by
President Clinton between 1993 and 1996, Segal (2000) found that female judges were
less likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases than male
judges. She had originally hypothesized that President Clinton’s appointees would be
more willing to rule in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases in keeping
with the idea of symbolic representation (Segal 2000). Symbolic representation refers to a
situation in which the demographic makeup of the federal bench mirrors that of the
general population, leading in turn to substantive representation, in which judges
endeavor to rule in such a way as to address their constituents’ concerns (Segal 2000).
Since President Carter made it a priority to increase diversity on the federal bench
in the late 1970s, the federal judiciary has featured more judges that are women, nonwhite, and/or non-Christian than in years past (Clinton 1996, Gottschall 1983). President
Clinton also advocated for increased diversity on the federal bench, arguing that nonwhite, non-Christian, and/or female judges would be more sensitive to the unique
concerns of the increasingly diverse American population than a white male Protestant
judge might (Clinton 1996). Segal (2000) found, however, that despite Clinton’s stated
intentions, there was a lack of evidence that non-white and/or female judges espoused
policy interests influenced by ideological beliefs or values to a greater degree than white
male judges, contradicting previous findings by Stidham, Carp, and Songer (1996)
indicating that Clinton’s appointees to the federal judiciary ruled largely along party
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lines. Segal (2000) supposed this could be due to several reasons: either similar
ideological beliefs that might be held by judges generally (especially since judges are
highly educated and tend to occupy a more lofty position on the socioeconomic scale;
Grossman 1966), heterogeneity within the non-white and female ranks (as demonstrated
by the ideological differences between Justices Thurgood Marshall and Clarence
Thomas, or between Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg), and/or
judicial socialization.
In her comparison of male versus female judges in the Ninth Circuit from 1972 to
1990 using a matched-judges approach (matching a male judge to a female judge with
similar demographic and ideological characteristics), Davis (1993) found that the
majority of dispositions in cases dealing with equal protection, violation of Title VII, or
deprivation of rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 relied on technical grounds, existing
case law, or precedent, negating the different voice hypothesis. After excluding those
cases and other cases not providing sufficient detail in order to prove the existence or
absence of the different voice hypothesis, Davis (1992) found that no judge fit neatly into
stereotypes based on their sex; they “[spoke] in both voices but emphasize[d] one voice
over the other” (Davis 1992:157) depending on the situation.
Race in the Courtroom
The vast majority of the work examining the effects that the race of the judge has
on judicial outcomes deals with criminal law (Kulik et al. 1996; Steffensmeier and
Hebert 1999), and as can be expected, have shown varying outcomes. Further, much
more of the empirical work deals with the defendant’s race rather than the race of the
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judge (Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Some have found that the judge’s race has little
or no impact on ruling or length of sentence (Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999); others
have found that white judges tend to hand down harsher sentences than non-white judges
(Gottschall 1983; Uhlman 1978). Still others, surprisingly, have found that non-white
judges actually tend to sentence more defendants to prison than white judges
(Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). Much of the work specifically dealing with the
difference in outcomes based on the race of the judge is in law journals, which, while
useful, is more often than not based on qualitative case studies rather than quantitative
data which can be generalized to a larger population.
Those researchers that find that non-white judges are harsher on defendants than
white judges usually attribute this to tokenism (Kanter 1977; Steffensmeier and Hebert
1999). “Token” racial minority judges might feel as if they are under the microscope to a
greater extent than their white colleagues, and might feel pressure from their white
colleagues (and constituents, if they were elected) to conform more to (white) elite norms
in keeping with their station as a judge (Kanter 1977). In an attempt to not appear weak
on crime or appear to be playing racial favoritism, for instance, African-American judges
might be less hesitant about sentencing guilty defendants to prison than white judges.
Non-white judges may also be taking into account their knowledge about the significant
effects that crime has on society as a whole, and on African-American communities
specifically, and see themselves as being part of the solution (Steffensmeier and Hebert
1999).
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African-American judges tended to sentence guilty defendants more harshly than
white judges, though this was only statistically significant for white defendants; with
respect to African-American defendants, both white and non-white judges handed down
more strict sentences than the defendant could expect to receive if he or she was white
(Uhlman 1978).
As with gender, explanations for differences in decision-making based on race
could fall into one of the same four broad categories: Gilligan’s different voice theory;
the informational perspective; the representative role; or the organizational perspective.
In one of the few studies specifically examining the effects of judge’s race on
employment discrimination cases, Chew and Kelley (2012) found that not only were
there significant differences in how judges ruled in employment discrimination cases
based on their race, but there was a statistically significant difference in how judges ruled
based on the plaintiff’s race. Non-white judges were even more likely to rule favorably in
a non-white plaintiff’s racial discrimination case than white judges (Chew and Kelley
2012).
Political Ideology of the Appointing President
There is a possibility that judges may be motivated by their own ideological views
to rule in a certain manner. Federal judges usually start out either as elected judges or
prosecutors in their state or city, and depending on the location, these races may or may
not be partisan in nature. However, judges at the federal level are appointed by the
president, not elected. Once they run the gauntlet of the appointment process through the
Senate, a federal judge generally keeps his or her seat for life, unless they move on of
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their own volition or are impeached due to an egregious violation. Therefore, they
(generally) cannot be removed from their position at a later time if a president with
opposing ideological views wants his or her “own people” on the bench (Cross 2003).
Even though they are not running in elections, the fact that federal judges are appointed
by a President with a political agenda of his or her own raises the question about how
ideologically driven the judges, in turn, might be (Schlanger et al. 2009; Sunstein et al.
2004), which may have an effect on the ultimate outcome of the case (Stidham, Rowland
and Carp 1983).
Further, since judges are not (generally) involved in the overt politicking in which
members of Congress or other federal officials engage, they may view their judgeship as
a way to express their views and drive policy indirectly. Cross (2003) tests this theory,
and finds that in addition to traditional legal principles, legal decisions are in fact
ideologically driven to some extent. While judges certainly are loath to admit this in
public (Cross 2003), their political ideologies may be exerting a subtle influence on their
decisions through the manner in which the judge interprets a given law or which
precedent they choose to support a given decision.
Due to the manner in which judges are appointed to federal judgeships, most
researchers have tended to use the political ideology of the appointing president as a
proxy. There have been attempts to measure political ideology of judges directly through
a combination of ranking attitudes about government intervention in economic and social
issues in society, beliefs based on social class and religion, and a subjective selfassessment of political ideology on a Likert scale (Gibson 1978).

38

Judges with more conservative ideologies have been theorized to be less likely to
hold sympathetic views towards employees filing discrimination complaints. This has
borne out in research showing that Christian evangelical judges are more likely to rule in
accordance with conservative values in sex discrimination cases than judges of other
religions in state supreme courts (Songer and Tabrizi 2004).
Research shows that judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely
to rule in favor of the plaintiff than judges appointed by Republican presidents (Cross
2003; Davis et al. 1993, Gottschall 1993; Kulik et al. 2003; Schultz and Petterson 1992;
Segal et al. 1995; Stidham, Rowland and Carp 1983).
Conservative judges have specifically stated, such as in EEOC v. Sears (628 F.
Supp. 1264 (N D Ill. 1986); also Krieger 1995 and McDonnell Douglas v. Green (411
U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)), that even if statistical evidence of
discrimination is proffered, that it will not be considered absent other, more direct,
evidence of discrimination (Krieger 1995). If a judge is not inclined to accept statistical
evidence of discrimination as probative in a case, this can be expected to lead to a lower
probability of a favorable outcome for the employee-claimant. Liberal judges, on the
other hand, are more likely to accept statistical evidence as evidence of discrimination
(Fradella 2003; Schultz 1990; Schultz and Petterson 1992), which may lead to a greater
probability that the plaintiff will win.
Earlier in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was more amenable to social
science evidence, most notably in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
The majority cited several studies speaking to the effects of segregation on African-
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Americans in favor of their ruling against segregation in the public school systems
(Fradella 2003). However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has been noticeably more
reluctant to accept social scientific evidence and has exhibited increased hostility toward
social scientific evidence (Fradella 2003). Fradella (2003) noted that when social
scientific evidence played a major role in the outcome of the case, this evidence was
more likely to be viewed negatively (56.1 percent of the time) than positively (41.5
percent of the time). In discrimination cases, courts were much more likely to accept
statistical evidence of discrimination in cases dealing with sex or age discrimination,
assuming the research itself was methodologically sound, than in cases dealing with
racial discrimination (Fradella 2003). The importance given to methodological quality is
striking. These findings suggest that judges know more about statistics than commonly
assumed, and that judges are paying attention to scientific rigor (at least with respect to
sex discrimination cases).
Sisk and colleagues (1998), in their study on the effects of judges’ personal
characteristics on decisions on federal criminal cases, found that the social background
model actually did not explain much of the variation in judicial decision-making. These
findings flew in the face of some of the most relied-upon research available to date work
(e.g., Danelski 1965; Grossman 1966; Schmidhauser 1959; Stidham, Rowland and Carp
1983). For instance, judges favoring a more originalist approach to judicial decisionmaking (the idea that in rendering decisions, a judge should construe the evidence and
issues in light of the intent postulated in the Constitution as closely as possible, related to
the legal model) actually were less likely to be appointed by President Reagan than one
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might otherwise suppose (Sisk et al. 1998), directly contradicting other findings (Davis et
al. 1993, Segal et al. 1995; Stidham, Rowland and Carp 1983). The discrepancy is
probably due at least in part to Sisk’s narrow focus on the effect of judge’s personal
characteristics on their feelings towards the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, rather than a
more broad view of judicial decision-making including civil law. The impact of political
ideology on case outcomes was only noticeable in the aggregate, and any influence
disappeared when examining the influence of a judge’s political ideology on a particular
case outcome (Sisk et al. 1998).
In his work on the attitudinal/political model of judicial decision-making, Gibson
(1978) examined criminal cases in the Iowa state court system, and found that the
political ideology of the judge actually had little to no impact on the severity of the
sentences imposed on guilty defendants; the only factor found to be statistically
significant was the severity of the charge. Gibson (1978) suggested that the judge’s role
orientation, or the attitudes and behaviors normally expected of judges, played a
mediating role between the judicial decision-making process and the political ideology of
the judge; judges suppressed their personal views and made their decision based solely on
the facts of the case and interpretation of existing case law according to principles of
sound legal reasoning, in keeping with the originalist view of constitutional law. Rather
than prescribing a conservative or liberal approach to jurisprudence under all situations,
the constructionist view exhorts the judge to take into account only that precedent that
applies to a certain situation. For example, in interpreting First Amendment-related
issues, precedent normally errs in favor of permission to express a particular view rather
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than censorship or suppression. A conservative judge holding strict constructionist views,
if he or she was consistent, should thus err on the side of permission even if he or she
personally disagreed with the views in question (Gibson 1978).
Political Ideology of the Judicial Circuit
Some judicial districts are generally regarded as more ideologically liberal or
progressive than others. As can be expected, there are conflicting findings regarding the
political ideology of the circuit between various studies, though some of the variation in
findings can be attributed to methodological issues. Some researchers have chosen the
approach of reviewing cases in certain circuits which have inspired controversy in the
past, such as the D.C. Circuit (Pierce Jr. 1988) or the Ninth Circuit (Law 2005).
Guthrie and Roth (1999), in examining how employers made the decision to offer
maternity benefits to its employees, hypothesized that the state in which the organization
was located would have some impact on the employer’s decision. One variable in their
model represents whether the state in which the organization is located has language
pertaining to marital status, pregnancy, maternity, or childbirth in their state’s
employment discrimination law, taking the values of yes or no (Guthrie and Roth 1999).
This in itself is somewhat puzzling, as they use the separate spheres doctrine as their
justification for including marital status in this variable. However, marriage and
childbearing are not perfectly correlated, and relying on this assumption erases the
experiences both of single mothers and married women without children, both of whom
are likely to be affected in some way by institutional policies on maternity leave.
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More troubling, however, is the way in which judicial circuit is operationalized in
this study. The “federal circuit” variable was merely split up into either circuits one
through seven or nine through eleven as “yes”, with the Eighth Circuit as the reference
group (Guthrie and Roth 1999). The justification for using the Eighth Circuit as the
reference group is that the Eighth Circuit “does not stand out as especially conservative
or especially liberal in either its composition or its rulings” (Guthrie and Roth 1999:51)
without any further justification or evidence to this effect. In addition, there are enough
differences in the political ideologies between the other circuits lumped together that it
seems prudent to split them up into a more granular set of variable values.
Peresie (2005), in her analysis of voting behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals,
took a similar approach to Guthrie and Roth (1999), but instead of selecting one circuit
and lumping the rest together into one variable value for no apparent reason, she
designated the Ninth Circuit as the reference, noting that prior research indicated that this
circuit was generally regarded as the most liberal. Also, in her dataset, the second-most
number of cases originated in the Ninth Circuit (73); only the Seventh Circuit had more,
with 83 cases (Peresie 2005). Dummy variables were then set up for each circuit
individually, and the D.C. Circuit was included.
As part of his study concerning the mechanisms controlling appointments to the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Stiglitz (2014) constructed a measure that attempted to determine
the individual political ideology of each appointee, and used this individual political
ideology measure to determine the mean political ideology of each judicial circuit in turn.
According to these findings, the Second, Third and Ninth circuits are the most liberal,
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and the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh circuits are the most conservative (Stiglitz
2014). In the middle lay the First, Fourth and Sixth Circuits (Stiglitz 2014). The D.C.
circuit was excluded as there were only two cases in the dataset in this district.
Stiglitz’s (2014) study rests on some assumptions that appear rather problematic.
With respect to the political ideology of the justices themselves, Stiglitz (2014) uses as
one of the independent variables an index score of political ideology which he developed
from interviews with attorneys published in the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary. The
interviews ask attorneys about their experiences in arguing cases before various judges,
touching on such topics as the judge’s courtroom demeanor and ideology. The problem
with this becomes immediately apparent: how trustworthy is self-reported data that in
itself might be biased as a result of the nature of the case that was argued before that
particular judge? For example, if an attorney was arguing a case alleging that their
imprisoned client’s civil rights were in some way violated, and the case ended up before a
conservative judge, might that attorney’s experience in dealing with that particular judge
have been biased, especially if the attorney lost the case?
As a result of the above, the extent to which Stiglitz’s (2014) political ideology
measure is a reliable factor in attempting to determine the mean political ideology of the
circuit is unclear. Further complicating the issue is that the measure attempting to
determine the political ideology of the circuit itself is predicated on cases decided by
judges who successfully navigated the appointment gauntlet and made it to the bench;
these judges may be materially different in some way than judges who are not successful
in securing an appointment to a federal judgeship.
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On the other hand, one study found that cases in district court formed a nonbinding precedent used to shape decision-making in similar subsequent cases; this held
across ideological lines, suggesting that the prevailing political ideology of the circuit
was viewed as less important by the judges than the wish to appear consistent and rule in
keeping with “an impartial mind” and sound legal reasoning (Sisk et al. 1998).
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CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES
In keeping with Dorsen’s social background theory, the four models of judicial
decision-making and the four perspectives of minority judges, the following hypotheses
are offered to explain the role that personal characteristics, both those of the judge and of
the plaintiff, play in judicial decision-making.
H1. Female judges will be more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff in sex
discrimination lawsuits than male judges.
Female judges may hold a more sympathetic view towards female plaintiffs in
discrimination cases than males might, simply because of the shared similarity of
experiences of discrimination in the workplace that men do not share, in line with
Gilligan’s different voice theory (Boyd et al. 2010; Davis et al. 1993; Steffensmeier and
Hebert 1999).
. However, other researchers have found no essential differences in how men and
women resolve problems and make decisions, which has been termed the organizational
perspective (Kulik et al. 1996; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999)
H2. Judges who are not white will be more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff in
sex discrimination lawsuits than white judges.
As with the gender divide in judicial decision-making, non-white judges may
have a more sympathetic view towards plaintiffs in discrimination cases than white
judges, simply because of the shared similarity of experiences of discrimination in the
workplace that white judges do not necessarily share, in line with Gilligan’s different

46

voice theory (Boyd et al. 2010; Chew and Kelley 2012; Gottschall 1983; Steffensmeier
and Hebert 1999; Uhlman 1978).
Alternatively, the informational perspective proposes that the presence of a nonwhite judge on an otherwise all-white panel may exert subtle influence on the panel to
vote in favor of the plaintiff when this otherwise might not happen if the judging panel
was staffed only with white judges (Allen and Wall 1993; Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie
2005). This could be due to white judges acting in socially desirable ways by not
rendering a decision against the plaintiff. This could also be due to the non-white judge,
in discussing the case with the judges, being able to persuade the other judges to vote in a
certain way. Several researchers, including Chew and Kelley (2012) and Steffensmeier
and Hebert (1999), have found that racial minority judges do exert influence over an
otherwise all-white judging panel in cases having to do with issues that concern
minorities.
H3. Judges with more liberal ideologies will be more likely to rule in favor of the
plaintiff than judges holding more conservative ideologies.
Judges with more conservative ideologies have been found to be less likely to
hold sympathetic views towards employees filing discrimination complaints. This has
borne out in research showing that Christian evangelical judges are more likely to rule in
accordance with conservative values in sex discrimination cases than judges of other
religions in state supreme courts (Songer and Tabrizi 2004).
Research also shows that judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more
likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff than judges appointed by Republican presidents
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(Davis et al. 1993, Kulik et al. 2003; Schultz and Petterson 1992; Segal et al. 1995;
Stidham, Rowland and Carp 1983). While federal judges are not elected in the traditional
sense, they are appointed by presidents with political party affiliations and ideological
agendas (Schlanger et al. 2009), which may have an effect on the ultimate outcome of the
case (Kulik et al. 2003; Stidham, Rowland and Carp 1983). In addition, federal judges
usually start out either as elected judges or prosecutors in their state or city, and
depending on the location, these races may or may not be partisan in nature.
In addition, conservative judges have specifically stated, such as in EEOC v.
Sears (628 F. Supp. 1264 (N D Ill. 1986)), that even if statistical evidence of
discrimination is proffered, that they will not consider it absent other evidence of
discrimination. This can be expected to lead to a lower probability of a favorable
outcome for the employee-claimant. Liberal judges, on the other hand, are more likely to
accept statistical evidence as evidence of discrimination (Schultz 1990, Schultz and
Petterson 1992), which may lead to a greater probability that the ultimate finding will be
in favor of the plaintiff.
H4. Female plaintiffs will be more likely to receive an unfavorable decision from
judges in an employment discrimination case than male plaintiffs.
Sex discrimination lawsuits are more likely to be unsuccessful than successful for
the plaintiff overall (Clermont and Schwab 2004; Krieger 1995; Peresie 2005; Selmi
2001). This could be explained by differences in how working women are viewed
compared to working men and the ideal roles that are prescribed for men versus women
(Acker 2006). As the majority of judges are male, judges may be more predisposed to
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rule unfavorably in cases featuring female plaintiffs, as they are less likely to
subconsciously identify with the female plaintiff due to the lack of experience of being a
woman. Other researchers have argued that judges may be more likely to rule against
female plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases due to a perception among judges,
fueled by conservative rhetoric, that there are too many employment discrimination cases
in the court system and that it is too easy to win an employment discrimination case
(Selmi 1996). Though he did not carry out the analysis to prove this theory, Selmi (1996)
pointed out that there was also a possibility that male judges may be more likely to have a
stay-at-home wife than a working wife, which may lead to a difference in the way a male
judge views a working woman generally.
Conversely, it is possible that judges may in fact be more likely to rule
unfavorably in cases featuring male plaintiffs, on the grounds that since the Act was
originally designed to reduce discrimination for women, the judge may not expect a sex
discrimination case to feature a male plaintiff, and, not wanting to appear sexist, may
subconsciously wish to hold that case to a higher standard of proof as a result. This line
of reasoning operates similarly to those who argue that white defendants are more likely
to receive lenient sentences than non-white defendants when the judge is not white
(Chew and Kelley 2012; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999).
H5. White plaintiffs will be more likely to receive favorable decisions from judges in
an employment discrimination case than non-white plaintiffs.
The tendency towards reductionism or essentialism manifests frequently in court
cases involving employment discrimination. One of the most frequently cited cases in
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which this occurs is DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division (413 F. Supp.
142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976); 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977)). The district court held that the
group of African-American plaintiffs could not raise allegations of both racial
discrimination and sex discrimination; they had to choose one or the other. If they were
able to demonstrate discrimination based on both race and sex, argued the district judge,
the African-American plaintiffs would have the opportunity to obtain a “super-remedy”
above and beyond that which could be obtained by either a group of African-American
males or white females (Areheart 2006, Crenshaw 1989; DeGraffenreid v. General
Motors Assembly Division 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976); 558 F.2d 480 (8th
Cir. 1977)). Adding insult to injury, the court construed evidence that General Motors
had previously hired white women as evidence that GM had not discriminated against
African-American women, a logical fallacy (Areheart 2006). In this case, the courts
refused to consider that an African-American woman may experience things differently
than an African-American man or a white woman, because an African-American woman
is not able to “put away” her African-American identity or her female identity when it
does not suit her to possess either of those identities.
In response to the insufficient redress afforded marginalized employees by
reductionist legal arguments, other courts have employed a view that identities could be
“tacked on,” so that each characteristic is treated as possessing an additive quality
(Abrams 1994; Areheart 2006; Green 2003). Under the additive view, a white man
experiences less discrimination than a white woman, who in turn experiences less
discrimination than an African-American woman, and so forth.
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There is a possibility that the results of sex discrimination suits may vary based on
the race of the plaintiff. For example, judges may be more predisposed to rule in favor of
a non-white plaintiff in a discrimination case due to the possibility that the effects of sex
discrimination and racial discrimination are operating on the plaintiff in an additive
fashion, as suggested by Crenshaw (1993). On the other hand, judges may have difficulty
determining that discrimination has definitely taken place due to a plaintiff’s gender and
thus rule against the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case if racial discrimination was not
specifically alleged, as suggested by Areheart (2006).
H6. The more ideologically liberal the judicial circuit, the more likely it is that a
particular judge will rule in a plaintiff’s favor in a sex discrimination lawsuit.
Some judicial districts are regarded as generally more ideologically liberal or
progressive than others. Following the findings of Stiglitz (2014) and Peresie (2005), I
hypothesize that rulings from the Second, Third and Ninth Judicial Circuits, generally
regarded as the most liberal circuits, are more likely to be favorable towards the
employee-claimant than those out of the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Judicial
Circuits, generally considered the most conservative districts.
H7. The odds that a plaintiff will receive a vote in their favor will increase for every
female judge sitting on the panel.
The informational perspective proposes that the presence of a female judge on an
otherwise all-male panel may exert subtle influence on the panel to vote in favor of the
plaintiff when this otherwise might not happen if the judging panel was composed of all
men (Allen and Wall 1993; Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005). This may be due to the

51

female judge empathizing with the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case due to
discrimination the judge herself may have previously experienced, and in discussing the
case with the judges, being able to persuade the other judges to vote in a certain way.
This could be due to female judges wishing to appear to act in socially desirable ways by
not rendering a decision against the plaintiff.
Related to this, the representational perspective further clarifies the informational
perspective by specifying that the “different voice” is especially salient when the issue is
something that concerns women or minorities specifically (as, for example, sex
discrimination in employment; Allen and Wall 1993). Several researchers, including
Farhang and Wawro (2004), Peresie (2005) and Allen and Wall (1993) have found that
female judges can exert influence over an otherwise all-male judging panel in cases
having to do with gendered issues.
However, other researchers have found no essential differences in how men and
women resolve problems and make decisions, termed the organizational perspective
(Kulik et al. 1996; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999). It is possible that these findings will
be replicated with this dataset.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
Data
This study is based upon secondary data originally collected by Sunstein, Schkade
and Ellman for a study published in 2004, later modified by Boyd, Epstein and Martin
(2010). Boyd’s dataset was used for this study, hereinafter referred to as the Harvard
dataset. It is currently (as of Spring 2018) housed online through Harvard University
(Boyd et al. 2010). This dataset collects information on various aspects of sex
discrimination cases brought by private plaintiffs and the EEOC from 1995 to 2002 based
on content analysis of court case filings. This dataset contains information on 415
decisions in total. These cases all deal with sex discrimination, were heard in the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, and published in federal reporters.
Each of these cases were heard by a panel of three judges, with each judge
rendering an opinion. The final decision was then rendered on a majority-rule basis.
Since the question of interest involves the determinants leading judges to rule in a certain
manner, the unit of analysis for this study will be decisions made by individual judges,
rather than ultimate case outcomes or rulings. In addition, since the vast majority of
decisions in cases are reached unanimously (Peresie 2005; Songer 1982), breaking down
the unit of analysis to decisions made by individual judges should result in less bias as
there will be more variation in the data. Each case therefore appears three times in the
database, once for each judge’s opinion. As a result, there are a total of 1,245 entries in
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the dataset, representing 410 cases (there are slightly fewer total cases as some cases had
more than one published decision included in the dataset).
A major limitation in using this dataset is that there was no information about the
plaintiff’s sex and race in the dataset except when the charge of employment
discrimination was specifically related to those issues. Even in these cases, this
information is limited to the inference that the plaintiff belongs to the protected class
under consideration in the lawsuit. For instance, it could be inferred that someone
alleging employment discrimination based on gender is most likely female, and someone
alleging racial discrimination is most likely not white. This is, in itself, a dangerous
assumption to make. Therefore, rather than relying on such unreliable assumptions,
information on the plaintiffs’ sex and race has been extracted from court documents and
added to the dataset as additional variables for each case. This information is typically
specified in the initial pleadings (the “complaint”) or in the published decisions for each
court case.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest is each judge’s vote in a case. This is
represented in the original dataset by the variable judge_vote. This variable takes the
values 0=conservative or 1=liberal. In keeping with prior research using this dataset,
conservative will be interpreted as an unfavorable outcome for the plaintiff, and liberal
will be construed as a favorable outcome for the plaintiff (Boyd et al. 2010; Sunstein,
Schkade and Ellman 2004).
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Independent Variables
One set of independent variables of interest contains the judge’s demographic
characteristics, including gender, race, and the political ideology of the judge rendering a
vote in the case. The second set considers court characteristics, such as the prevailing
political ideology for the circuit in which the case was brought and the number of females
on the panel. The third set of independent variables concerns the sex and race of the
plaintiff.
The gender of the judge is denoted by gender_judge, and takes one of two
possible values: 1=female or 0=male.
The judge’s race is denoted in the dataset by the variable minority_judge, which
can take either the value of 0=White or 1=Minority.
The political ideology of the president who appointed the judge is denoted as
party_judge. This takes one of two values: 1=Democrat or 0=Republican. This is not a
perfect measure of the individual judge’s political ideology. However, since many
judges’ election races are non-partisan, it would be nearly impossible to determine the
political ideology of each individual judge. Given that judges are appointed to federal
courts by the President, and judges appointed by Republican presidents tend to rule more
conservatively than judges appointed by Democrat presidents (Ashenfelter et al. 1995;
Peresie 2005; Stidham, Rowland, and Carp 1983), using the appointing president’s
political party as a proxy for the political ideology of the judge is a reasonable substitute.
In the Harvard dataset, the trial court in which the case is brought is represented
by the variable circuit, which has possible values ranging from 1-12, each corresponding
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to a particular circuit court (the D.C. circuit is the “12th” circuit). The circuit variable was
then aggregated into dummy variables liberal, moderate, and conservative to reflect the
prevailing political ideology of each of the circuits. Following Stiglitz’s (2014) model,
the liberal variable will include the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits (Sunstein et al.
2004). Moderate circuits include the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth circuits (Stiglitz
2004). Finally, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits are classified as
conservative circuits (Stiglitz 2004). Since Stiglitz’s (2004) analysis did not include the
D.C. Circuit, in keeping with Peresie (2005), the D.C. Circuit was added to the moderate
category.
The number of female judges on the panel is represented by the variable num_fem
with possible values ranging from 0 (all-male panel) to 3 (all-female panel). This variable
was further converted into a series of dummy variables for all-male panel, one female,
two females, and three females on the panel. This variable will be used to test specifically
for operation of the representational and/or informational models of women in judicial
decision-making.
The plaintiff’s gender is featured in the Harvard dataset as female_plaintiff, where
0=male and 1=female. Cases featuring both male and female plaintiffs were included in
the male plaintiff category for purposes of analysis.
The plaintiff’s race is not featured in the original Harvard dataset. Therefore, this
information has been extracted from either the initial pleadings or the final ruling, and
added to the dataset where available. The plaintiff’s race is denoted in the dataset by the
nominal variable minority_pltf, which can take either the value of 0=White or

56

1=Minority. Cases where the plaintiff’s race is not specified are coded as unknown and
are included in the white plaintiff category for purposes of analysis.
Control Variable
The age of the judge is included as a control variable. The judge’s age as of the
date of resolution of the case was calculated as a new variable (judgeage) by using the
COMPUTE command in SPSS to subtract the judge’s birth year (year_birth) from the
year the case was resolved (dec_year). This variable was stored as a ratio variable. There
is some controversy about whether age has a significant effect on judicial decisions.
Some (Ashenfelter et al. 1995) have found no significant relationship between age and
judicial decisions, while other researchers have found that older judges tended to vote
more liberally in death penalty cases (Brace and Hall 1997). Still other researchers have
found that younger judges tended to rule more often in the plaintiff’s favor than older
judges in employment discrimination cases (Kulik et al. 2003).
Statistical Analysis
Listwise deletion of missing data will eliminate cases where data is missing from
analysis, increasing the validity of the analysis (Allison 1999:79).
Univariate analyses report descriptive statistics for the variables of interest (winloss distribution of judge’s votes; judges’ age, race, and sex; political affiliation; number
of females sitting on the judging panel in each case; distribution of cases throughout the
judicial districts by political ideology; and plaintiff’s race and gender). These results are
reported in Table 1.1, and discussed in greater detail in the Results section.
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Bivariate and multivariate analyses will be used to measure the presence and
strength of association. A correlation matrix will demonstrate presence and strength of
correlation, as well as check for multicollinearity. Crosstabs will examine the
relationships between the judge’s vote in a case and the independent variables to
determine if there is a relationship between these variables, and if so, how strong the
relationship is. Chi-square tests will also be run to determine if the association between
the dependent and independent variables, if it exists, is statistically significant. Crosstabs
and significance testing results are reported in Table 2.1 and will be discussed further in
the Results section.
Binary logistic regression using the General Estimating Equations (GEE) method
will be used to analyze the association between the dependent and independent variables,
as well as the strength, direction, and significance of the association should an association
exist. Odds ratios will also be calculated. These results are reported in Tables 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.2a-d, and discussed in greater detail in the Results section. GEE models were
estimated because one judge could hear multiple cases, and thus the observations cannot
be considered independent.
As it can be assumed that the same judge’s votes in different cases will be at least
somewhat correlated with one another, it is necessary to cluster standard errors to correct
for correlation within subjects (Cameron and Miller 2015). In cases where data is
naturally clustered, as they are here with an individual judge having anywhere from one
to 25 votes represented in the dataset, using default standard errors runs the risk of the
standard errors being underestimated, leading to artificially high test statistics and
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correspondingly artificially low p-values (Cameron and Miller 2015). In SPSS, using the
GEE feature allows the researcher to specify robust standard errors, leading to more
precise results. Previous researchers (e.g., Chew and Kelley 2012) have used this
procedure to examine judicial decision-making in the past. While SPSS reports Cox and
Snell and Nagelkerke pseudo-R squares as part of the standard logistic regression
procedure, this function is not included within the GEE procedure (IBM N.d.), so pseudoR squares will not be reported here.
The first model will examine whether there is an association between the
dependent variable (judge’s vote in a case) and each of the independent variables having
to do with the personal characteristics of the judge (judge’s race, gender, and political
ideology) after controlling for judge’s age. This model tests for presence of the different
voice perspective, as well as the political model of judicial decision-making.
The second model considers whether there is a relationship between the judge’s
vote and the number of females on the judging panel and circuit in which the trial is held,
to test for the presence of the informational and/or representational perspective.
The third model will examine where there is an association between the
dependent variable (judge’s vote in a case) and each of the independent variables having
to do with the personal characteristics of the plaintiff (plaintiff’s race and gender).
The fourth model pulls together the first three models to consider whether the
judge’s characteristics in combination with the plaintiff’s characteristics and court
characteristics play a role.
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Finally, a fifth model brings in interaction variables created to encompass
different combinations of race and gender within a judge or plaintiff and political
ideology, to the previous model. In keeping with Crenshaw’s intersectionality theory
(1989, 1991), the impacts of one’s race, gender and age on the ultimate decision rendered
may be different for different combinations of race, gender and age. In other words, a
middle-aged African-American female judge may view cases differently than a younger
or older African-American female judge, a middle-aged white female judge, or a middleaged African-American male judge, because of the intersection of the individual’s
experience as a middle-aged person, their experience as an African-American, and their
experience as a female. Researchers have noted that disentangling these effects thus far
has proven very difficult (Abrams 1994).
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
The objective of this thesis is to determine the extent to which identity
characteristics of the judge and the plaintiff play a role in how judges rule in employment
discrimination cases based on sex pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The
results of that analysis are presented in detail in this section. Descriptive statistics report
frequencies, means, and standard deviations for the independent, dependent, and control
variables. Crosstabs and chi-square tests determine whether there is an association
between the independent and dependent variables of interest, and if applicable, the
strength and direction of the association. Logistic regression models generated using the
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) procedure delve deeper into the data, to explore
the nature of any such associations (i.e., multiple causation, spurious relationships, etc.).
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics. The dependent variable of interest is each
individual judge’s vote in a case. As discussed earlier, each of the cases in the dataset was
heard by a panel of three judges at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and each judge
recommended ruling either in favor of or against the plaintiff. As the ultimate research
question centers on the determinants that lead judges to rule a certain way, it is more
appropriate to analyze the individual judge’s vote, rather than the ultimate case outcome,
which is based on the majority opinion in the case. This variable is dichotomous, in
which conservative represents a vote against the plaintiff, and liberal represents a vote in
favor of the plaintiff.
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(Table 1.1 about here)
Judges are more likely to vote against plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases in
court than in favor. Out of 1245 cases, 808 votes (64.9 percent) went against the plaintiff,
while 437 votes (35.1 percent) were in favor of the plaintiff.
A separate procedure was run to filter out duplicate cases by judge, resulting in a
total of 310 unique judges rendering at least one vote in a sex discrimination case in this
dataset. Out of 310 judges who heard employment discrimination cases based on sex
between 1995 and 2002, 267 judges (86.1 percent) were male, and 43 judges (13.9
percent) were female. 276 judges (89.0 percent) were white, 18 judges (5.8 percent) were
African-American, 13 judges (4.2 percent) were Hispanic, and three judges (1.0 percent)
were Asian-American. Due to the small number of non-white judges, the latter categories
were combined into a “minority judge” variable for later analyses. 136 judges (43.9
percent) were appointed by Democratic presents, and Republican presidents appointed
56.1 percent of the judges (174). The judges’ ages ranged from 43 to 93 years at the time
of case decision (mean=64.18, standard deviation=10.875).
As each judge serving on a panel in a case would hear the case in the same
district, and the plaintiff’s characteristics would remain the same within a particular case
regardless of which judge’s vote is considered, after removing the “duplicate judges”
filter to once again include all cases, another filter was created to capture only one
judge’s vote for each case, thereby considering each lawsuit only once. As some cases
had more than one published decision in the dataset (dealing with two or more separate
issues within the same case), there are a total of 410 cases represented in the dataset. 344
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plaintiffs (83.9 percent) were female, 61 plaintiffs (14.9 percent) were male, and five
cases (1.2 percent) featured both male and female plaintiffs. For further analysis, the
mixed-gender cases were combined with the male plaintiffs. 260 cases (63.4 percent)
were heard by all-male panels. 131 cases (32.0 percent) had one female judge on the
panel, and 19 cases (4.6 percent) featured two female judges. There were no cases heard
by an all-female panel. 19.0 percent of the cases (78 cases) were heard in liberal circuits
(Second, Third, or Ninth); 25.1 percent (103 cases) in moderate circuits (First, Fourth,
Sixth, Tenth, and DC); and 55.9 percent (229 cases) were in conservative circuits (Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh).
Bivariate Analysis
Table 2.1 reports bivariate statistics, including crosstabs and chi-square
significance testing. Crosstabs were run using column percentages, and alpha was set at
0.05 for purposes of significance testing. Among female judges, 95 votes (55.9 percent)
went against the plaintiff, and 75 votes (44.1 percent) went in favor of the plaintiff.
Among male judges, 713 votes (66.3 percent) went against the plaintiff, and 362 votes
(33.7 percent) went in favor of the plaintiff. This difference is statistically significant
(χ2=7.028, p<0.01). As expected, male judges are more likely to rule against the plaintiff
in sex discrimination cases than female judges, though overall, more votes went against
the plaintiff than in favor.
(Table 2.1 about here)
Among white judges, 743 votes (66.2 percent) went against the plaintiff, and 380
votes (33.8 percent) went in favor of the plaintiff. Among non-white judges, 65 votes
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(53.3 percent) went against the plaintiff, and 57 votes (46.7 percent) went in favor of the
plaintiff. This difference is statistically significant (χ2=8.018, p<0.01). Surprisingly, at
least in the bivariate analysis, a judge is more likely to rule against the plaintiff than in
favor regardless of the judge’s race, though the difference appears less stark for nonwhite judges than white judges.
Male plaintiffs received 132 votes (71.0 percent) against their case and 54 votes
(29.0 percent) in favor of their cases. On the other hand, female plaintiffs received 661
votes (63.3 percent) in favor of their case and 383 votes (36.7 percent) against their case.
This difference is statistically significant (χ2=12.271, p-value<.01). Male plaintiffs are
more likely to receive votes against their cases than female plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs in the white category received 687 votes (63.8 percent) against their
case and 390 votes (36.2 percent) in favor of their cases. Non-white plaintiffs received
121 votes (72.0 percent) against their case and 47 votes (28.0 percent) in favor of their
case. This difference is statistically significant (χ2=4.327, p-value<.05). While plaintiffs
are still more likely to receive votes against their case regardless of race, the difference
appears less striking for white plaintiffs than non-white plaintiffs.
Judges nominated by Republican presidents cast 557 votes (70.7 percent) against
the plaintiff and 231 votes (29.3 percent) in favor of the plaintiff. On the other hand,
judges nominated by Democratic presidents cast 251 votes (54.9 percent) in favor of the
plaintiff and 206 votes (45.1 percent) against the plaintiff. This difference is statistically
significant (χ2=31.545, p-value<0.001). Republican judges are thus more likely to rule
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against the plaintiff than judges nominated by Democratic presidents, and Democratic
judges are more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff than against.
Judges in liberal circuits cast 116 votes (49.6 percent) against the plaintiff and 118
votes (50.4 percent) in favor of the plaintiff. Judges in moderate circuits cast 188 votes
(60.3 percent) against the plaintiff and 124 votes (39.7 percent) in favor of the plaintiff.
Judges in conservative circuits cast 504 votes (72.1 percent) against the plaintiff and 195
votes (27.9 percent) in favor of the plaintiff. This difference is statistically significant
(χ2=43.006, p-value<0.001). As expected, judges in liberal districts are more likely to
vote in the plaintiff’s behavior than judges in conservative districts, with judges in
moderate districts in between. Judges in liberal districts are marginally more likely to rule
in favor of the plaintiff than against. On the other hand, judges in moderate and
conservative districts are more likely to rule against the plaintiff.
Judges serving on an all-male judging panel voted against the plaintiff 551 times
(69.6 percent) and in favor of the plaintiff 241 times (30.4 percent). If there was one
female judge on the panel, judges voted against the plaintiff 217 times (54.8 percent) and
in favor of the plaintiff 179 times (45.2 percent). If there were two female judges on the
panel, judges voted against the plaintiff 40 times (70.2 percent) and in favor of the
plaintiff 17 times (29.8 percent). There were no all-female judging panels. The
correlation between these two variables is 0.099, indicating that absent any other factors,
the number of female judges on the panel explains less than one percent of the variation
in judge’s vote. Although there is no clear direction of association among these variables,
as the likelihood of receiving a vote in favor of the plaintiff’s case increases with the
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addition of one female judge to an all-male judging panel, and then decreases once there
is more than one female judge on the panel, this association is statistically significant
(χ2=26.021, p-value<0.001).
Multivariate Analysis
Before proceeding with the regressions, the variables were checked for
multicollinearity due to concern that there may be some redundancy between the judge’s
race and the political party of the judge’s appointing president; gender and the political
party of the judge’s appointing president; and judge’s vote and number of females on the
panel. A correlation matrix using all of the variables showed that none of the correlations
were above 0.391 or below -0.903 (correlation between no females on the judging panel
and one female on the judging panel=-0.903). However, for our purposes, the all-male
judging panel will be treated as the reference group, so the variables for an all-male
judging panel and a panel with one female judge will not appear in the same model. Since
SPSS does not provide an option for running multicollinearity diagnostics within the
logistic regression procedure, a regular linear regression model was run to check the
tolerance and VIF. No tolerance value was less than 0.616, and all VIF values were less
than 1.624. Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem with these
variables.
Table 3.1 presents the results of four models (Models 1-4). Model 1 was initially
run as a binary logistic regression model using judge_vote as the dependent variable. The
independent variables were the judge’s age, sex, race, and political party.
(Table 3.1 about here)
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Model 1 as a whole has a QICC (Corrected Quasi Likelihood under Independence
Model Criterion) of 1588.326. The estimated odds of a female judge ruling in the
plaintiff’s favor are 33.5 percent higher than for a male judge, after controlling for age,
race, and political party of the judge. This finding is not statistically significant
(Wald=2.072, p-value=0.150). The estimated odds of a non-white judge ruling in the
plaintiff’s favor are 28.8 percent higher than a white judge, after controlling for age, sex,
and political party of the judge. This finding is also not statistically significant
(Wald=0.833, p-value=0.361). While each additional year of age is estimated to increase
the odds that a judge will rule in favor of the plaintiff by less than one percent, this is not
statistically significant (Wald=1.070; p-value=0.301). Judges appointed by Democratic
presidents are 78.2 percent more likely to vote in favor of the plaintiff than judges
appointed by Republican presidents, after controlling for age, sex, and race of the judge.
This finding is statistically significant. (Wald=17.876, p-value<0.001).
In addition, to test for an association between judge’s gender and race and the
judge’s vote in a case, without considering any political factors, a separate model (Model
1a) uses the judge’s vote as the dependent variable, and the judge’s gender and race as
the independent variables. The judge’s age will also be controlled for in Model 1a. The
results of this analysis are reported in Table 3.4.
(Table 3.4 about here)
The estimated odds of a female judge voting in favor of a plaintiff in an
employment discrimination case are 66.7 percent higher than for a male judge, after
controlling for age and race of the judge. This finding is statistically significant

67

(Wald=6.154, p-value=0.013). The estimated odds of a non-white judge voting in favor
of a plaintiff are 72.3 percent higher than for a white judge, after controlling for age and
sex of the judge. This finding is barely statistically significant (Wald=3.893, pvalue=0.048). While the judge being one year older is estimated to increase the odds that
they were appointed by a Democratic president by 1.1 percent, this is not statistically
significant (Wald=2.154; p-value=0.142). Not taking political factors into consideration,
the judge’s gender and race do play a significant role in judicial decision-making
patterns.
Model 2 examines the effect of court-related variables on the likelihood that a
judge will vote in the plaintiff’s favor in an employment discrimination case. Model 2 has
a QICC of 1559.642, a significantly better fit over Model 1. The estimated odds of a
judging panel with one female judge ruling in the plaintiff’s favor increases by 78.0
percent compared to an all-male judging panel, after controlling for the political ideology
of the circuit group. This finding is statistically significant (Wald=20.759, pvalue<0.001). The estimated odds of a judging panel with two female judges ruling in the
plaintiff’s favor are actually 17.4 percent lower than an all-male judging panel, after
controlling for the political ideology of the circuit group. This finding, however, is not
statistically significant (Wald=0.356, p-value=0.551). The estimated odds of a judge in a
liberal circuit ruling in the plaintiff’s favor are 156.4 percent higher than a judge in a
conservative district, after controlling for the number of female judges on the panel. This
finding is statistically significant (Wald=27.785, p-value<0.001). The estimated odds of a
judge in a moderate circuit ruling in the plaintiff’s favor are 64.2 percent higher than a
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judge in a conservative district, after controlling for the number of female judges on the
panel. This finding is also statistically significant (Wald=11.472, p-value=0.001).
Model 3 tests for the relationship between the judge’s vote and the independent
variables dealing with the plaintiff’s gender and race. Model 3 has a QICC of 1607.583, a
significantly worse fit than either of the two prior models. The estimated odds of a female
plaintiff receiving a favorable vote from a judge are 59.1 percent higher than the odds of
a male plaintiff receiving a favorable ruling, after controlling for the plaintiff’s race. This
finding is statistically significant (Wald=6.570, p-value=0.010). The estimated odds of a
non-white plaintiff receiving a favorable vote from a judge are 32.4 percent lower than
the odds of a white plaintiff receiving a favorable ruling, after controlling for the
plaintiff’s sex. Likewise, this finding is statistically significant (Wald=4.490, pvalue=0.034). Not surprisingly, female plaintiffs are more likely to receive favorable
votes than male plaintiffs, and non-white plaintiffs are less likely to receive favorable
votes than white plaintiffs.
Model 4 combines the previous three models. Model 4 therefore tests for the
relationship between the direction of the judge’s vote and the sex, race, and political party
of the judge, number of women judges on the panel, the political ideology of the circuit,
and the plaintiff’s sex and race, while controlling for the judge’s age.
Model 4 has a QICC of 1534.683, a better fit than any of the prior models. The
estimated odds of a female judge casting a favorable vote are 3.3 percent higher than the
odds of a male judge casting a favorable vote, after controlling for all other variables.
However, this finding is not statistically significant (Wald=0.025, p-value=0.874). The
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estimated odds of a non-white judge casting a favorable vote are 32.2 percent higher than
the odds of a white judge casting a favorable vote, after controlling for all other variables.
This finding is also not statistically significant (Wald=1.251, p-value=0.263). The
estimated odds of a judge in a liberal circuit casting a favorable vote are 147.9 percent
higher than the odds of a judge in a conservative district casting a favorable vote, after
controlling for all other variables. This finding is statistically significant (Wald=25.765,
p-value<0.001). The estimated odds of a judge in a moderate circuit casting a favorable
vote are 64.4 percent higher than the odds of a judge in a conservative district casting a
favorable vote, after controlling for all other variables. This finding is also statistically
significant (Wald=12.645, p-value=0.001). Each additional year of age increases the
likelihood that a judge will cast a favorable vote in a sex discrimination case by less than
one percent. However, this finding is not statistically significant (Wald=1.139, pvalue=0.286). Having one female judge on the panel increases the likelihood that a judge
will cast a favorable vote by 72.1 percent over an all-male judging panel, after controlling
for all other variables. This finding is statistically significant (Wald=14.510, pvalue<0.001). Having two female judges on the panel, however, decreases the likelihood
that a judge will cast a favorable vote by 20.5 percent compared to an all-male judging
panel. This finding is not statistically significant, however (Wald=0.474, p-value=0.491).
The estimated odds of a non-white plaintiff receiving a favorable vote are 37.0 percent
lower than the odds of a white plaintiff receiving a favorable vote, after controlling for all
other variables. This finding is statistically significant (Wald=5.526, p-value=0.019). The
estimated odds of a female plaintiff receiving a favorable vote are 69.3 percent higher
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than the odds of a male plaintiff receiving a favorable vote, after controlling for all other
variables. This finding is also statistically significant (Wald=6.972, p-value=0.008). The
estimated odds of a judge appointed by a Democratic president ruling in favor of a
plaintiff are 61.8 percent more likely than for a Republican-appointed judge to rule in
favor of a plaintiff, after controlling for all other variables. This finding is statistically
significant (Wald=13.487, p-value<0.001).
Model 5 includes variables for interaction between identity characteristics within
plaintiffs and judges to model 4. Initially, four interaction variables were created and
added to the model: one for judge’s race and judge’s gender, one for judge’s gender and
political ideology, one for judge’s race and political ideology, and one for plaintiff’s race
and gender. Each of these interaction terms was added separately and then jointly. These
results are reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.2a-d. None of these interaction terms were
significant.
(Tables 3.2 and 3.2a-d about here)
As a result of the results reported in Table 3.1 under Model 1, in order to check
for an association between the judge’s gender and/or race and their political affiliation, a
separate model (Model 6) uses the political affiliation of the judge’s appointing president
as the dependent variable, and the judge’s gender and race as independent variables. The
age of the judge will also be controlled for in this model. These results are reported in
Table 3.3.
(Table 3.3 about here)

71

The estimated odds of a female judge being appointed by a Democratic president
are 526.4 percent higher than to be appointed by a Republican president, after controlling
for age and race of the judge. This finding is statistically significant (Wald=13.363, pvalue<0.001). The estimated odds of a non-white judge being appointed by a Democratic
president are 1,199.4 percent higher than to be appointed by a Republican president, after
controlling for age and sex of the judge. This finding is also statistically significant
(Wald=16.786, p-value<0.001). While the judge being one year older is estimated to
increase the odds that they were appointed by a Democratic president by 2.7 percent, this
is not statistically significant (Wald=2.785; p-value=0.095).
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
Overall, the best model for explaining the relationship between case outcomes,
the judge’s gender, the political ideology of the judicial circuit and the political party of
the judge’s appointing president was Model 4, including factors related to the judge, the
court, and the plaintiff (QICC=1534.683). This would seem to suggest that the political
factors both at the individual (judge) and aggregate (circuit) level play an important role,
at least at the Court of Appeals level. There is some suggestion that personal identity
characteristics of the plaintiff play a role as well in the judicial decision-making process.
However, notably, the judge’s gender and the judge’s race do not have a significant
impact on the judicial decision-making process as independent causative factors.
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Only in Model 1a, which does not take into
account political, court, or plaintiff-related factors, was the judge’s gender, in and of
itself, a significant predictor. If political factors are not taken into consideration, the
judge’s gender does have a significant impact on judicial decision-making patterns. A
female judge is 66.7 percent more likely to vote in the plaintiff’s favor than a male judge.
However, once political factors are taken into consideration, the effects of the judge’s
gender fade into non-significance, suggesting that the political factors moderate the effect
of the judge’s gender. The judge’s gender was also a significant predictor of the political
party of the judge’s appointing president (Table 3.3). This relationship between the
judge’s gender and the political party of the appointing president may have a significant
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impact on the judicial decision-making process, though further testing would be required
to confirm this new hypothesis.
A female judge is over 500 percent more likely to be appointed by a Democratic
judge than by a Republican judge. President Carter made it his mission to appoint more
female judges to the federal bench (Clinton 1996, Gottschall 1983), a tradition carried
forward by Presidents Clinton (Clinton 1996; Segal 2000; Stidham, Carp and Songer
1996) and Obama (Goldman, Slotnick and Schiavoni 2013; Tobias 2010). The data in
this study demonstrates that the judge’s gender is a powerful predictor of whether the
judge is more likely to be appointed by a Democratic president or a Republican president.
In turn, judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to rule in the
plaintiff’s favor in a sex discrimination case. This appears to be powerful evidence for
operation of the political model of judicial decision-making, in keeping with prior
findings from Cross (2003), Davis et al. (1993), Kulik et al. (2003) Schultz and Petterson
(1992), Segal et al. (1995), and Stidham, Rowland and Carp (1983), among others.
However, these findings contrast with those from Sisk et al. (1998), though the inclusion
of other types of cases in Sisk’s models may have muted the effect.
As with hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 was not supported by the data. As with gender,
the race of the judge in and of itself was not a significant predictor of the judge’s
likelihood of voting in favor of the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case. Only in Model
1a, which does not take into account political, court, or plaintiff-related factors, was the
judge’s race, in and of itself, a significant predictor. If political factors are not taken into
consideration, the judge’s race does have a significant impact on judicial decision-making
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patterns. A non-white judge is 72.3 percent more likely to vote in the plaintiff’s favor
than a white judge. However, once political factors are taken into consideration, the
effects of the judge’s race fade into non-significance, suggesting that the political factors
moderate the effect of the judge’s race.
The judge’s race was an even more powerful predictor of whether they would be
appointed by a Democratic president than the judge’s gender. A judge who is not white is
over a thousand percent more likely to be appointed by a Democratic president than by a
Republican president. Being appointed by a Democratic president, in turn, increased the
likelihood of a favorable vote for the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case by 67.6
percent. This provides further support for the political model of judicial decision-making
(Cross 2003). These findings contrast with those from Chew and Kelley (2012), though
Chew and Kelley (2012) did not consider the effects of the political ideology of the
circuit or of the judge’s appointing president in their models. Likewise, these findings are
also not consistent with those from Gottschall (1983), who found that African-Americans
were only marginally more likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases
than other Democrats. However, the fact that Gottschall (1983) included criminal cases
and other types of discrimination cases in his dataset may have some effect on his results.
These findings are also not in line with those from Sisk et al. (1998), though as with
Gottschall, the inclusion of other types of cases in Sisk’s models may have muted the
effect.
Hypothesis 3, that conservative judges are more likely to rule against the plaintiff
than liberal judges, was supported by the data. Judges appointed by Democratic
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presidents are 67.6 percent more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff than judges
appointed by Republican presidents (Table 3.1). This finding is similar to findings from
Songer and Tabrizi (2004), as well as findings from Davis et al. (1993), Kulik et al.
(2003), Schultz and Petterson (1992), Segal et al. (1995), and Stidham, Rowland and
Carp (1983), but contrast with those from Sisk et al (1998). As before, the inclusion of
other types of cases in Sisk’s models may have muted the effect.
Hypotheses 4 and 5, dealing with the plaintiff’s gender and plaintiff’s race,
respectively, were both supported by the data. Once the judge’s characteristics and the
court characteristics were added to the model, the likelihood of a female plaintiff
receiving a favorable vote rose from 59.1 percent more likely to 69.3 percent more likely,
and the likelihood of a non-white plaintiff receiving a favorable vote remained almost the
same (32.4 percent less likely before judge and court variables were added, and 37.0
percent less likely in the full model).
The finding that a female plaintiff was more likely to receive a favorable vote
than a male plaintiff is most likely due to the fact that Title VII was created in order to
reduce discrimination against women (in addition to other classes of disadvantaged
individuals). Men may be less likely to file a discrimination claim, feeling that the law
does not pertain to them. In turn, judges may feel that men who do file a discrimination
claim should be held to a higher standard of proof than women. Farhang and Wawro
(2004) did find that men claiming reverse discrimination were less likely to receive a
favorable ruling that women claiming discrimination, though they did not speculate as to
a cause for this finding. This finding is deserving of further confirmation.
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The finding that a non-white plaintiff was less likely to receive a favorable vote in
a sex discrimination case was not surprising in light of DeGraffenreid and other, similar
cases (413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976); 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977)) and
findings from other researchers (Abrams 1994; Areheart 2006; Crenshaw 1989, 1991).
These findings provide some evidence that courts have still not learned to deal with the
problems brought to light by DeGraffenreid in a manner that takes into account all of the
plaintiff’s intersecting identities and considering how the individual plaintiff experiences
discrimination, rather than on the group level.
However, confirming this finding with newer data is advised for several reasons.
One is simply that because the race of the plaintiff was not specified in the majority of
the cases in the dataset, over three quarters of the cases were classified as “unknown”
race. Since it was felt that if the plaintiff’s race was not mentioned in the decision, it must
not have played a significant factor, the “unknown race” plaintiffs were combined with
white plaintiffs for purpose of analysis. It is possible that some of these “unknown race”
plaintiffs are in fact not white, which may have affected the results. In addition, just
because a plaintiff may not be white does not mean that they are alleging racial
discrimination in addition to sex discrimination. Since these cases are primarily based on
sex discrimination, any allegations of racial discrimination are in addition to sex
discrimination, and thus there is likely a very small number of individuals actually
alleging racial discrimination in addition to sex discrimination. In addition, other
socioeconomic factors such as education or income may be playing a part in a chain
relationship. Liberal circuits are located either in the Northeast or in the Pacific regions,
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while moderate districts are distributed throughout the Rocky Mountain, Midwest and
Southern regions of the country. Residents of the Northeast or Pacific regions of the
country may be wealthier and/or more highly educated than residents elsewhere, which
could in turn impact a judge’s perception of a plaintiff in court. Finally, examining newer
cases would allow the researcher to examine the impact of newer case law which may
have impacted the findings in those cases.
Hypothesis 6, that ideologically liberal judicial circuits are more likely to render
decisions in the plaintiff’s favor overall, is supported by the data. Judges in liberal
circuits are 147.9 percent more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff than judges in
conservative circuits, and judges in moderate districts are 64.4 percent more likely to rule
in favor of the plaintiff than judges in conservative circuits. These findings were both
statistically significant. This is in keeping with the findings of Peresie (2005) as well as
Guthrie and Roth (1999).
Recall that the distribution of judicial circuits was based on previous findings
from Guthrie and Roth (1999), Peresie (2005), and Stiglitz (2004). It is possible that a
district deemed liberal is in fact more ideologically moderate or conservative, that a
district deemed moderate is in fact be more ideologically liberal or conservative, or that a
district deemed conservative is in fact more ideologically liberal or moderate. Testing
these assumptions would require consideration of the ideological views of each
individual judge, independently of the ideological views of the appointing president, and
is beyond the scope of this study. However, this is an important assumption to test.
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Hypothesis 7, concerning the number of female judges on the panel, was
confirmed to some extent and disconfirmed to an extent. Adding one female judge to the
panel did increase the likelihood of a judge casting a favorable vote by 71.1 percent over
an all-male panel, as expected. Paradoxically, however, having two female judges on the
panel actually decreased the likelihood of a plaintiff receiving a favorable vote by 20.6
percent. This finding was not significant, possibly due to the small number of cases heard
by panels with two female judges. In addition, there is a possibility that the role of the
token may actually switch from the female judges to the male judges since the male judge
would be the minority in a two-female-judge panel. If this were to be the case, the male
judge may actually be influencing the female judges to vote against the plaintiffs if the
Informational or Representative model of minority identities in judicial decision-making
were in operation. However, since this dataset contains no cases heard by all-female
panels, it is impossible to use this dataset to determine whether the decline in pro-plaintiff
votes is part of a larger trend or just an aberration in the data. This finding contrasts with
prior results from Allen and Wall (1993) and Peresie (2005), who found that the number
of female judges did have a significant effect on a judge’s vote in a sex discrimination
case. However, these findings do mirror those of Farhang and Wawro (2004), at least
with respect to the level of influence the female judges have over male judges. Farhang
and Wawro (2004) did not find that the female judges influenced each other to any
significant degree on a two-female-judge panel, however.

79

Limitations
Some caveats exist concerning the data used for this study. The results of this
study should not be interpreted too broadly due to the limitations inherent in the
underlying data. Replication of the analyses with a newer dataset is strongly
recommended. This dataset, ideally, would contain demographic variables pertaining to
the claimant’s race for all plaintiffs (not just in cases where racial discrimination is
alleged). Educational background, job classification, religion, and marital status of the
plaintiff would also be helpful, but collection of this data may be difficult if it is not
already present in court filings.
It would have been preferable to consider cases that were heard in the district
courts but not appealed further as well. However, the only freely available datasets
containing cases heard at all levels of the court system had major limitations (lack of
usable cases, lack of information on judges, and/or large amounts of missing data) that
ultimately made the datasets unsuitable for this study (Schlanger et al. 2009; Federal
Judicial Center, N.d.) or were too large to make gathering data for the missing variables
feasible given the time available (Federal Judicial Center, N.d.).
In addition, having data newer than 2002 would have been preferable. The dataset
from the Federal Judicial Center would have solved this problem, as data is currently
(Fall 2017) available through June 30, 2016. However, even after removing all cases not
pertaining to employment discrimination and pending employment discrimination cases,
there were still well over 15,000 cases in the dataset from the Federal Judicial Center.
Further, this dataset does not identify the specific judge(s) for each case, nor does it
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identify any of the demographic characteristics of the plaintiff. Extracting demographic
information for both the judge and the plaintiff would be too time-consuming given the
available time and resources.
Another limitation concerns the lack of information concerning the plaintiff’s
race. Recall that there were very few cases in which the plaintiff’s race was specifically
mentioned, likely because race is not a salient factor in the majority of sex discrimination
case.
An issue deserving additional consideration is whether the fact that all of the
cases represented in this dataset are published in federal reporters biases the data
compared to using both published and unpublished decisions. It is very difficult to obtain
free, publically-available access to unpublished decisions (Keele et al. 2009). Adding
unpublished cases to the dataset would be too costly given the possible return for the
project at hand. Prior to 1964, all Appeals Court decisions were published; this changed
in 1964 due to the increasing volume of cases flowing through the appellate courts (Keele
et al. 2009). After 1964, each circuit developed their own set of rules for determining
which cases would be published (Keele et al. 2009).
The issue of whether cases differ based on whether they are published in reporters
has support on both sides of the argument. Some researchers find a significant difference
in ideology in published decisions compared to unpublished decisions (Keele et al. 2009,
Law 2005, Siegelman and Donohue 1990); others find the opposite (Songer and Sheehan
1992). However, most of these case studies dealt with very specific populations: cases
involving the U.S. Forest Service as a party (Keele et al. 2009), cases brought by asylum-
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seekers in the Ninth Circuit (Law 2005), or cases from the Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits only (Songer and Sheehan 1992). This raises the question of how generalizable
the finding that there is a bias in published cases versus unpublished cases really is.
There were significant differences in published cases versus unpublished cases in
cases dealing specifically with employment discrimination (Siegelman and Donohue
1990). Employment discrimination cases filed in New York, Chicago, or Philadelphia
had a one-in-five chance of being published, compared to a one-in-twenty chance for
cases filed in the South or San Francisco. In addition, cases settled prior to trial were less
likely to be published than cases in which a trial had been held.
Directions for Future Research
The finding that non-white plaintiffs are less likely to receive a favorable vote
deserves further research to determine the extent to which intersectionality plays a role in
discrimination cases.
Since a large portion of the variation in case outcomes likely has to do with the
nature of the cases themselves, a mixed-methods design consisting of qualitative content
analysis to bolster the results of the quantitative analysis would also be fruitful. The
review process necessary to extract the plaintiff’s race revealed several cases where
statistical analysis would not begin to scratch the surface of the true story. One of these
cases involved a male transgender plaintiff who argued that he was unlawfully denied
health insurance due to his history of transition surgeries (Mario v. P&C Food Mkts.,
Inc., 313 F.3d 758 (2002)). Another case involved a woman who alleged that she was
raped by her male supervisor (Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343 (1995)). Still
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another involved a man contending that he was bullied by his co-workers and supervisors
because of his sexual orientation to the extent that he suffered a heart attack due to the
stress (Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2000)). At the other end of the spectrum, one
man alleged that he was refused a $156.00 reimbursement for work-related expenses due
to his sex (Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d 597 (2001)).
Specifically, content analysis could determine the extent to which application of
doctrine plays a role in judicial decision-making (Eisenberg and Johnson 1990; Fradella
2003; Schrama 2011; Tiller and Cross 2006). If doctrine plays a large role in how judges
make decisions, and if there is not much difference in the way different judges apply
doctrine, this would indicate support for the legal model. In order to study the extent to
which the legal model and/or the political models of judicial decision-making, qualitative
approaches are much more appropriate than quantitative approaches. Under the legal
model, cases are to be considered solely on their merits according to objective criteria
and examination of every minute detail in the case. It would be impossible to develop
variables to encompass every detail in enough cases to meet statistical restrictions, and to
compare those variables meaningfully across cases (e.g., Tyree 1981). This would help to
demonstrate the operation of the legal model to an extent not possible here due to the
nature of the data.
Similarly, studying the extent to which the political model plays a role in judges’
decision-making processes also favors a qualitative approach. Judges generally do not
write in their opinions that they “ruled for the plaintiff because [they are] a liberal”
(Cross 2003:1464) or admit that any other factor played a role in the judge’s decision
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other than those principles espoused in the legal model of judicial decision-making. To
do otherwise would be running afoul of professional norms. As part of his or her oath of
office, a judge is required to swear that they will uphold the law in an impartial manner.
Evidence that other factors may be playing a role may exist in written dissents or judges’
private notes, memoirs or interviews, and could also be inferred from reviewing a judge’s
entire body of work and looking for larger patterns in their decisions.
The number of residents of conservative districts and the number of residents of
liberal districts are almost exactly the same (98,820,527 residents of liberal districts as of
2000, compared to 99,867,559 residents of conservative districts as of 2000; United
States Census Bureau 2000). Given this, it is curious to note that there were almost twice
as many lawsuits filed in conservative districts from 1995-2002 as in liberal districts. Is
this because more residents of conservative districts experience behavior at work that
they feel is discriminatory than residents of liberal districts? Further research to
determine if this is an aberration, or if this is reflective of a larger trend, and if so, why,
would be fruitful.
Finally, running tests to more accurately determine the “true” political ideology of
judicial circuits would lend additional credibility to studies that use circuit-level political
ideology as a variable. This would most likely require content analysis of the judge’s
entire body of work, from federal rulings down to the state and local levels, in order to try
to determine the individual political ideology of each judge more precisely.
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Implications for Public Policy
Some have decried recent attempts by researchers to use their empirical legal
research on this topic to influence public policy (Sisk and Heise 2004). Sisk and Heise
(2004) discuss an incident in which Sunstein and his colleagues presented their research
finding a significant relationship between political ideology and judicial decision-making
(Sunstein et al. 2004) to a meeting of Democratic senators. Senator Charles Schumer was
apparently so impressed by this research that he referred to it in his testimony during a
Congressional hearing on the issue of ideological bias within the judiciary, as well as at
the confirmation hearings for Judge Miguel Estrada, in support of Schumer’s argument
that Democrats should oppose many of President George W. Bush’s appointees to federal
court positions because of the presumption that Bush wished to pack the courts with his
“own” (conservative) judges (Sisk and Heise 2004).
The preceding is a rather extreme example of how social scientific research can
influence policy. Certainly, the findings in this study should raise concern among
lawmakers as to the influence that their ideological opinions and conflicts are having on
the courtroom. Knowing how the judicial decision-making process works generally may
be instructive to members of Congress as they review their judicial appointment
processes and currently existing anti-discrimination legislation, and seek out avenues for
improvement. While it is unlikely that Congress and/or the president will be removed
completely from the appointment process due to the nature of our government processes,
there appears to be some argument in favor of a more ideologically-neutral intermediary
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at some point in the appointment process (possibly through career bureaucrats within the
federal court system and/or the Department of Justice).
Also, if judges are able to reflect on their own judging behavior and identify some
troublesome patterns, is it not good that they have the opportunity to understand and
modify those patterns? While implicit bias proves remarkably resistant to interventions
intended to combat it (Greenwald and Krieger 2006; Jolls and Sunstein 2006; Levinson
2007), there has been some movement on this front in recent years. One group of
researchers (Devine et al. 2012) developed a training program intended to reduce implicit
biases that did produce statistically significant long-lasting results.
There is no reason why attorneys cannot use this information to understand the
judicial decision-making process. If attorneys had a better understanding of what occurs
on the other side of the bench, they can improve the ways they advise their clients and
gather evidence as they prepare their cases for trial in order to improve their chances of
obtaining a successful outcome for their clients. Indeed, the argument could be made that
just as an attorney is required to keep their knowledge as to the current status of the law
up to date, that they should also be required to educate themselves as to the best way to
advocate strenuously for their clients. This seems like a logical extension of the code of
professional ethics to which all attorneys are required to understand and comply as part of
their duties.
Finally, the large variation in case outcomes depending on the judicial circuit
hearing the case and the political party of the judge’s appointing president points to the
inequities of rights based on one’s zip code, and also to the potential for abuse by
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ideologically-driven presidents by filling the courts with judges that agree with them
ideologically. Since the plaintiff is constrained to filing the case in the judicial district in
which either they or the company is located, the plaintiff is not at liberty to choose a
circuit which may be more sympathetic to them. Congress would do well to explore ways
to ensure some level of consistency across the different circuits, and to limit the amount
of undue influence presidents and Congress can have on the federal judge selection
process.
Conclusion
The objective of this thesis is to determine the extent to which identity
characteristics of the judge and the plaintiff play a role in how judges rule in employment
discrimination cases based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The results of
that analysis, using a modified dataset from a previous study performed by Boyd and
colleagues (2010) and clustering standard errors in order to correct for within-subject
correlations, provided very limited support for Dorsen’s social background theory in that
judicial decisions were influenced primarily by the political ideology of the judicial
circuits, as well as of the appointing president.
The evidence of operation of the political model of judicial decision-making was
surprisingly strong, overshadowing the effects of personal identity characteristics. There
is no evidence that personal, demographic characteristics of judges such as gender or race
play any significant role in judicial outcomes. This should provide some small measure of
relief for plaintiffs fearing that their case may be doomed the minute they walk into the
courtroom to find a panel of three elderly white male judges at the stand.
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While influence and bias from one’s political views cannot be eliminated
completely, as an unknown portion of that bias is undoubtedly subconscious, increased
awareness on the part of judges as to the role subconscious biases may be playing in their
decisions should play a part in leveling the playing field for women in the courtroom. It is
considered unethical for parties to a case to engage in “judge-shopping” (where attorneys
attempt to put their case before judges perceived as being more sympathetic to their
client’s viewpoints when they file cases or requests for hearings), so attorneys will not be
able to completely avoid judges perceived as “tough” or unsympathetic to their clients.
Rather, awareness that biases exist may assist attorneys in preparation of their cases in
such a way as to ensure a fair outcome for their clients.
Sex discrimination in the workplace has a significant dampening effect on the
ability for women to reach their true potential, and harms employers by making it more
difficult for women to perform to their highest ability and thus produce increased profit
for their employers. While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 doubtless has done
much to increase the relative standing of women in the workplace compared to men,
there is still a long way to go. The courts can only do so much to enforce Title VII,
inasmuch as they are constrained to act only on cases that are brought to them. The courts
are also constrained by such factors as legal doctrine, precedent, existing case law, and
legal socialization, though the degree of constraint exerted by these factors will remain a
hotly contested issue for the foreseeable future.

88

Table 1.1 – Descriptive Statistics - Demographics
Percent
Judge’s vote
Conservative
Liberal
JUDGE’S
CHARACTERISTICS
Judge gender
Male
Female

Mean

SD

Range

64.18

10.875

43-93

0.41

1.600

0-2

64.9
35.1

86.1
13.9

Minority judge
Yes
No

11.0
89.0

Political party
Conservative
Liberal
Age of judge**

56.1
43.9

CASE
CHARACTERISTICS
Circuit ideology
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal

55.9
25.1
19.0

Plaintiff’s gender
Male
Female
Mixed

14.9
83.9
1.2

Plaintiff race
White
Non-white
Unspecified

5.6
13.7
80.7

Number of females
on panel
0
1
2
3

63.4
32.0
4.6
0

* – N=1245 refers to the total number of decisions in the dataset. There are three decisions for each case;
therefore, there are 410 cases and 310 judges represented in the dataset. Some cases went to the Court of Appeals
more than once. Judge’s characteristics were calculated based on 310 judges and case characteristics were
calculated based on 410 cases.
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Table 2.1 – Summary Table of Crosstabs and Significance Testing for
Judge’s Vote and Independent Variables
Conservative Liberal
Judge’s gender
Male
Female
Judge’s race
White
Not white
Plaintiff’s gender
Male
Female
Plaintiff’s race
White or unknown
Not white
Political ideology of
circuit
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Nominating
president’s party
Republican
Democrat
# female judges on
panel
None
One
Two
Three

Chi-square (p-value)

66.3
55.9

33.7
44.1

7.027 (0.008)

66.2
53.3

33.8
46.7

8.018 (0.005)

71.0
63.3

29.0
36.7

12.271 (0.002)

63.8
72.0

36.2
28.0

4.327 (0.038)

72.1
60.3
49.6

27.9
39.7
50.4

36.306 (p<0.001)
3.940 (0.047)
29.716 (p<0.001)

70.7
54.9

29.3
45.1

31.545 (p<0.001)

69.6
54.8
70.2
0

30.4
45.2
29.8
0

26.021 (p<0.001)

N=1245 for all analyses.
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Table 3.1 - Logistic Regression of the Effects of Demographic and Political
Characteristics on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case

JUDGE
Judge female (ref=male)
Judge not white
(ref=white)
Judge age
Democrat
(ref=Republican)
COURT
Liberal circuit
(ref=conservative)
Moderate circuit
(ref=conservative)
One female judge
(ref=all-male panel)
Two female judges
(ref=all-male panel)
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff female (ref=male)

M1
Beta (se)

Odds
ratio

0.289
(0.201)
0.253
(0.277)
0.007
(0.007)
0.578***
(0.137)

1.335

M2
Beta (se)

M3
Beta (se)

1.008
1.782

0.941***
(0.179)
0.496**
(0.146)
0.577***
(0.127)
-.192
(.321)

2.564
1.642
1.780
0.826

0.464*
(0.181)
-0.391*
(0.185)
-1.383
1245
1588.326

Odds
ratio

1.288

Plaintiff not white
(ref=white)
Intercept
N
QICC

Odds
ratio

-1.120
1245
1559.642

-0.959
1245
1607.583

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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1.591
0.676

M4
Beta (se)

Odds
ratio

0.033
(0.206)
0.279
(0.250)
0.007
(0.007)
0.481***
(0.130)

1.033

0.908***
(0.179)
0.497***
(0.139)
0.543***
(0.143)
-0.230
(0.334)

1.706

0.527**
(0.199)
-0.462*
(0.196)

1.693

-2.547
1245
1534.683

1.322
1.007
1.618

1.644
1.721
0.795

0.630

Table 3.2 - Logistic Regression of the Effects of Demographic and Political
Characteristics on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case, Including Interaction
Variables

JUDGE
Judge female
(ref=male)
Judge not white
(ref=white)
Judge age
Democrat
(ref=Republican)
COURT
Liberal circuit
(ref=conservative)
Moderate circuit
(ref=conservative)
One female judge
(ref=all-male panel)
Two female judges
(ref=all-male panel)
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff female
(ref=male)
Plaintiff not white
(ref=white)
INTERACTIONS
Judge’s gender and
race
Judge’s gender and
ideology
Judge’s race and
ideology
Plaintiff’s gender
and race
Intercept
N
QICC

M5
Beta (se)

Odds ratio

-0.108
(0.289)
0.255
(0.228)
0.007
(0.006)
0.439***
(0.152)

0.898

0.939***
(0.180)
0.515***
(0.141)
0.540***
(0.143)
-0.235
(0.334)

2.558

0.417
(0.217)
-1.579*
(0.670)

1.517

-0.270
(0.590)
0.263
(0.358)
0.085
(0.394)
1.270
(0.719)

0.763

1.291
1.007
1.550

1.673
1.717
0.790

0.206

1.300
1.088
3.560

-2.047
1245
1537.883

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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Table 3.2a - Logistic Regression of the Effects of Demographic and Political
Characteristics on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case, Including Interaction
Between Judge’s Race and Judge’s Gender

JUDGE
Gender
difference, white
judge
Gender
difference,
minority judge
Race difference,
male judge
Race difference,
female judge
Judge age
Democrat
(ref=Republican)
COURT
Liberal circuit
(ref=conservative
)
Moderate circuit
(ref=conservative
)
One female judge
(ref=all-male
panel)
Two female
judges
(ref=all-male
panel)
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff female
(ref=male)
Plaintiff not white
(ref=white)
INTERACTION
Judge’s gender
and race
Intercept
N
QICC

M5a
Beta (se)

Odds
ratio

0.049
(0.214)

1.051

-0.097

0.908

0.305
(0.285)
0.159

1.356

0.007
(0.006)
0.479***
(0.129)

1.007

0.912***
(0.180)

2.488

0.494***
(0.141)

1.640

0.544***
(0.143)

1.722

-0.224
(0.334)

0.800

0.525**
(.0200)
-0.463*
(0.196)

1.690

-0.146
(0.550)

0.864

1.172

1.396

0.629

-2.146
1245
1536.612

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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Table 3.2b - Logistic Regression of the Effects of Demographic and Political
Characteristics on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case, Including Interaction
Between Judge’s Gender and Political Ideology

JUDGE
Ideology
difference, male
judge
Ideology
difference, female
judge
Judge not white
(ref=white)
Judge age
Gender difference,
Republican judge
Gender difference,
Democrat judge
COURT
Liberal circuit
(ref=conservative)
Moderate circuit
(ref=conservative)
One female judge
(ref=all-male
panel)
Two female judges
(ref=all-male
panel)
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff female
(ref=male)
Plaintiff not white
(ref=white)
INTERACTIONS
Judge’s gender and
ideology
Intercept
N
QICC

M5b
Beta (se)

Odds ratio

-0.093
(0.287)

0.911

0.096

1.101

0.283
(0.249)
0.007
(0.006)
0.455**
(0.142)
0.266

1.328

0.911***
(0.180)
0.497***
(0.140)
0.542***
(0.142)

2.487

-0.219
(0.335)

0.804

0.528**
(0.199)
-0.461*
(0.197)

1.695

0.189
(0.345)

1.208

1.007
1.576
1.305

1.644
1.720

0.631

-2.141
1245
1536.442

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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Table 3.2c - Logistic Regression of the Effects of Demographic and Political
Characteristics on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case, Including Interaction
Between Judge’s Race and Judge’s Political Ideology

JUDGE
Judge female
(ref=male)
Ideology
difference, white
judge
Ideology
difference,
minority judge
Judge age
Race difference,
Republican judge
Race difference,
democrat judge
COURT
Liberal circuit
(ref=conservative)
Moderate circuit
(ref=conservative)
One female judge
(ref=all-male
panel)
Two female judges
(ref=all-male
panel)
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff female
(ref=male)
Plaintiff not white
(ref=white)
INTERACTIONS
Judge’s race and
ideology
Intercept
N
QICC

M5c
Beta (se)

Odds ratio

0.033
(0.206)
0.271
(0.228)

1.033

0.261

1.298

0.007
(0.006)
0.480***
(0.136)
0.470

1.007

0.908***
(0.179)
0.497***
(0.140)
0.543***
(0.143)

2.480

-0.230
(0.334)

0.794

0.527**
(0.199)
-0.462*
(0.197)

1.693

0.010
(0.371)

1.010

1.311

1.617
1.600

1.644
1.721

0.630

-2.146
1245
1536.682

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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Table 3.2c - Logistic Regression of the Effects of Demographic and Political
Characteristics on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case, Including Interaction
Between Judge’s Race and Judge’s Political Ideology

JUDGE
Judge female
(ref=male)
Ideology
difference, white
judge
Ideology
difference,
minority judge
Judge age
Race difference,
Republican judge
Race difference,
Democrat judge
COURT
Liberal circuit
(ref=conservative)
Moderate circuit
(ref=conservative)
One female judge
(ref=all-male
panel)
Two female judges
(ref=all-male
panel)
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff female
(ref=male)
Plaintiff not white
(ref=white)
INTERACTIONS
Judge’s race and
ideology
Intercept
N
QICC

M5c
Beta (se)

Odds ratio

0.033
(0.206)
0.271
(0.228)

1.033

0.261

1.298

0.007
(0.006)
0.480***
(0.136)
0.470

1.007

0.908***
(0.179)
0.497***
(0.140)
0.543***
(0.143)

2.480

-0.230
(0.334)

0.794

0.527**
(0.199)
-0.462*
(0.197)

1.693

0.010
(0.371)

1.010

1.311

1.617
1.600

1.644
1.721

0.630

-2.146
1245
1536.682

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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Table 3.3 – Effects of Judge’s Demographic Characteristics on Political Party Affiliation

Judge female (ref=male)
Judge minority (ref=white)
Judge age

Beta (se)
1.835*** (0.502)
2.564*** (0.626)
0.027 (0.016)

Intercept
N
QICC

-2.778
1245
1420.051

Odds ratio
6.264
12.994
1.027

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is party affiliation, coded 0=Republican and 1=Democrat.
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Table 3.4 – Effects of Judge’s Demographic Characteristics, Exclusive of Political
Factors, on Votes in an Employment Discrimination Case

Judge female (ref=male)
Judge minority (ref=white)
Judge age

Beta (se)
0.511* (0.206)
0.544* (0.276)
0.011 (0.007)

Intercept
N
QICC

-1.412
1245
1604.699

Odds ratio
1.667
1.723
1.011

*** = Significant at p<0.001.
** = Significant at p<0.01.
* = Significant at p<0.05.
The dependent variable is judge_vote, coded 0=conservative (loss) and 1=liberal (win).
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